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COORDINATION IN A TWO-STAGE CAPACITATED SUPPLY CHAIN 
WITH MULTIPLE SUPPLIERS 
SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis is to coordinate the inventory policies in a decentralized supply 
chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The system considered is a 
decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple independent suppliers 
and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The suppliers operate on a 
make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. On the 
other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy.  
Since the suppliers are capacitated, each supplier is modeled as an / /1M M  make-
to-stock queue under necessary assumptions. Furthermore, the average outstanding 
backorders and the average inventory level of each supplier are derived using the 
queuing model. 
On the other hand, to model the manufacturer as a queuing system, first an 
approximate distribution is derived for the interarrival times of the manufacturer. The 
idea behind the approximation is the expectation that the supplier with the minimum 
base stock level affects the interarrival times of the manufacturer the most. Then, the 
manufacturer is modeled as a / /1GI M  queue under necessary assumptions. 
Moreover, the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system and the average 
outstanding backorders at the manufacturer are obtained using the queuing model. 
After the supply chain has been modeled as a queuing system, the centralized and 
decentralized models are developed. In the centralized model, the objective of the 
single decision maker is to minimize the average total backorder and holding costs 
per unit time for the overall system. The decision variables are the base stock levels 
of the suppliers. Therefore, in the decentralized model, the objective of each supplier 
is to minimize the average cost per unit time for his own system.  
When the optimal solutions to the centralized and decentralized models are 
compared, it is concluded that only the supplier with the minimum base stock level 
needs coordination. Therefore, contracts are prepared between that supplier and the 
manufacturer.  
Three different transfer payment contracts are studied in this thesis. These are the 
backorder cost subsidy contract, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto 
improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to 
its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. The analyses of the 
contracts point out that all three contracts have the ability to coordinate the supply 
chain. However, when the Pareto improvement is taken into account, the cost sharing 
contract seems to be the one that will be preferred by both members.  
In this thesis, also a numerical study is performed to compare the centralized and 
decentralized systems based on SCOR Model performance metrics, which are the 
total number of outstanding backorders, the order fulfillment lead time, the supply 
 xvi
chain response time, the total backorder and holding costs, and the inventory days of 
supply. The results denote that the decentralized system has a better performance 
than the centralized system according to the total number of outstanding backorders 
and the order fulfillment lead time, which are customer-facing metrics. On the other 
hand, the centralized system performs better according to the internal-facing metrics, 
which are the total backorder and holding costs and the inventory days of supply. 
Finally, according to the supply chain response time, which is also a customer-facing 
metric, it is found that the centralized system generally has a better performance than 
the decentralized system. 
After the centralized and decentralized systems have been compared based on these 
performance metrics, the simple additive weighting method is used to decide which 
system is more preferable. When each criterion is taken as equally important, it is 
found that the decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system. Then, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the most sensitive criterion. The results 
indicate that the inventory days of supply is the most sensitive criterion; and it is 
followed by the total backorder and holding costs, and the supply chain response 
time, respectively. On the other hand, the total number of outstanding backorders and 
the order fulfillment lead time are insensitive to the ranking of the systems. The 
results obtained from the sensitivity analysis also point out that the decentralized 
system is more preferable than the centralized system. 
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KAPASĐTESĐ SINIRLI ÇOKLU TEDARĐKÇĐDEN OLUŞAN ĐKĐ KADEMELĐ 
BĐR TEDARĐK ZĐNCĐRĐNĐN KOORDĐNASYONU 
ÖZET 
Bu tezin amacı, rassal talebe sahip merkezkaç bir tedarik zincirindeki envanter 
politikalarını kontratlar aracılığıyla koordine etmektir. Ele alınan sistem, sınırlı 
üretim kapasitesine sahip çoklu bağımsız tedarikçi ve bir üreticiden oluşan iki 
kademeli merkezkaç bir tedarik zinciridir. Tedarikçiler stok için üretim yapmakta ve 
envanter yönetiminde temel stok yöntemini kullanmaktadır. Üretici ise sipariş için 
üretim prensibine göre çalışmaktadır. 
Tedarikçilerin kapasitesi sınırlı olduğu için, gerekli varsayımlar altında her tedarikçi 
bir / /1M M  stok-için-üretim kuyruk sistemi olarak modellenmiştir. Ayrıca, kuyruk 
modeli kullanılarak her tedarikçinin ortalama bekleyen sipariş miktarı ve ortalama 
envanter seviyesi elde edilmiştir. 
Diğer yandan, üreticinin bir kuyruk sistemi olarak modellenebilmesi için, öncelikle 
gelişlerarası sürelerinin yaklaşık dağılımı bulunmuştur. Söz konusu dağılım, en 
düşük temel stok seviyesine sahip tedarikçinin üreticinin gelişlerarası sürelerini en 
çok etkileyeceği beklentisinden yola çıkarak elde edilmiştir. Daha sonra, gerekli 
varsayımlar altında üretici bir / /1GI M  kuyruk sistemi olarak modellenmiştir. 
Bunun yanı sıra, kuyruk modeli kullanılarak üreticinin sistemindeki ortalama iş 
sayısı ve ortalama bekleyen sipariş miktarı bulunmuştur. 
Tedarik zincirinin bir kuyruk sistemi olarak modellenmesinden sonra, merkezi ve 
merkezkaç modeller geliştirilmiştir. Merkezi modelde karar vericinin amacı, sistemin 
tümü için birim zamandaki ortalama toplam bekleyen sipariş ve elde tutma 
maliyetlerini enküçüklemektir. Karar değişkenleri tedarikçilerin temel stok 
seviyeleridir. Bu nedenle merkezkaç modelde, her bir tedarikçi kendi sistemi için 
birim zamandaki ortalama maliyeti enküçüklemeye çalışır. 
Merkezi ve merkezkaç modellerin eniyi çözümleri karşılaştırıldığında, sadece en 
düşük temel stok seviyesine sahip tedarikçinin koordine edilmesi gerektiği sonucuna 
varılmıştır. Bu nedenle, sadece bu tedarikçi ve üretici arasında kontratlar 
hazırlanmıştır. 
Bu tezde, transfer ödemesine dayalı üç farklı kontrat üzerine çalışılmıştır. Bu 
kontratlar, bekleyen sipariş maliyetini destekleme kontratı, Pareto iyileştirmeye 
dayalı transfer ödemesi kontratı ve maliyet paylaşımı kontratıdır. Her kontrat, 
koordinasyon yeteneği ve Pareto iyileştiren olup olmaması yönünden 
değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, üç kontratın da tedarik zincirinin koordinasyonunu 
sağladığı ispatlanmıştır. Pareto iyileştirme göz önüne alındığında ise, maliyet 
paylaşımı kontratının her iki üye tarafından da tercih edilmesi beklenebilir. 
Bu tezde ayrıca, merkezi ve merkezkaç sistemlerin SCOR Model performans 
ölçütleri açısından karşılaştırılması için sayısal bir çalışma gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ele 
alınan performans ölçütleri, toplam bekleyen sipariş miktarı, sipariş karşılama süresi, 
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tedarik zinciri cevap süresi, toplam bekleyen sipariş ve elde tutma maliyetleri ve 
envanter gün sayısıdır. Sonuçlar, müşteriye-dönük ölçütler olan toplam bekleyen 
sipariş miktarı ve sipariş karşılama süresi açısından, merkezkaç sistemin merkezi 
sisteme nazaran daha iyi bir performansa sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Diğer 
yandan, içe-dönük ölçütler olan toplam bekleyen sipariş ve elde tutma maliyetleri ve 
envanter gün sayısına göre ise, merkezi sistem daha iyi bir performansa sahiptir. Son 
olarak, yine müşteriye-dönük bir ölçüt olan tedarik zinciri cevap süresine 
bakıldığında, merkezi sistemin merkezkaç sisteme nazaran genellikle daha iyi bir 
performans gösterdiği bulunmuştur. 
Merkezi ve merkezkaç sistemler söz konusu performans ölçütlerine göre 
karşılaştırıldıktan sonra, hangi sistemin daha tercih edilir olduğunu belirlemek için 
basit toplamlı ağırlıklandırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Her ölçütün eşit öneme sahip 
olması durumunda, merkezkaç sistemin merkezi sisteme nazaran tercih edildiği 
görülmektedir. Daha sonra, en duyarlı ölçütü belirlemek için duyarlılık analizi 
uygulanmıştır. Sonuçlar, envanter gün sayısının en duyarlı ölçüt olduğunu 
göstermektedir. Bunu sırasıyla, toplam bekleyen sipariş ve elde tutma maliyetleri ve 
tedarik zinciri cevap süresi takip etmektedir. Toplam bekleyen sipariş miktarı ve 
sipariş karşılama süresinin ise sistemlerin sıralamasına duyarsız olduğu bulunmuştur. 
Duyarlılık analizinden elde edilen sonuçlar, aynı zamanda merkezkaç sistemin 
merkezi sisteme nazaran daha tercih edilebilir olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intensifying competition in today’s business environment has brought the need of 
paying more attention to the design and management of supply chains. Starting from 
the effective product design, selection of the suppliers, facility location decisions, 
inventory management, distribution strategies, information technology, and finally 
the coordination and integration activities are critical factors for an effective supply 
chain.  
Supply chain management can be defined as the integration of all the activities taking 
place beginning from the arrival of the demand, until the time the products are 
distributed to the end customer. According to Simchi-Levi et al. (2000), “supply 
chain management is a set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers, 
manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced and 
distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, and at the right time, in order 
to minimize system wide costs while satisfying service level requirements.” 
The origins of the supply chain management can be traced back to 1950s and 1960s, 
when traditional mass manufacturing was employed to reduce costs and improve 
productivity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the manufacturers noticed the importance of 
inventory management and storage costs. In the 1980s, the companies utilized new 
strategies such as just-in-time manufacturing, Kanban system, lean manufacturing, 
and total quality management to improve quality, manufacturing efficiency, and 
delivery times. In the 1990s, as the competition intensified further, the companies 
began to form supply chain partnerships to achieve specific objectives and benefits. 
In addition, they began to understand the necessity of integrating the activities 
through the supply chain. The improvement of information technology has aided the 
evolution of the integrated supply chain concept. Today, the companies continue to 
investigate the ways of effective supply chain management to stay competitive in the 
market (Wisner et al., 2005, pp. 10-12).  
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Supply chains generally consist of multiple agents, such as suppliers, manufacturers, 
warehouses, and distribution centers. In a supply chain, if there is a single decision 
maker who tries to optimize the overall system, such a structure is called centralized. 
However, generally the agents have conflicting objectives even they belong to the 
same entity. For instance, manufacturers would like to produce in large lot sizes in 
order to reduce setup costs. However, this would increase the inventory amounts, and 
hence the holding costs, which contradicts the objectives of the warehouses. On the 
other hand, a supply chain in which each agent tries to optimize its own system is 
referred to as decentralized.  
A centralized system leads to global optimization, whereas, a decentralized system 
results in local optimization of the agents. Therefore, to achieve the global optimal 
solution in a decentralized supply chain, the conflicting objectives of the agents 
should be aligned through coordination issues. 
Supply chain coordination can be accomplished via contracting on a set of transfer 
payments between the supply chain members. A contract is said to coordinate the 
supply chain, if each member acts rationally according to the supply chain optimal 
solution, i.e., the decentralized solution is equal to the centralized solution. There are 
also other initiatives to coordinate a supply chain, such as quick response, efficient 
consumer response, and vendor managed inventory. In quick response, by sharing 
information, supply chain members work together to respond more quickly to 
customer needs. This brings forth better customer service and fewer inventories. 
Efficient consumer response, in which real-time point-of-sale data can be viewed by 
all supply chain members, is another concept that concerns with speed and 
flexibility. Thus, safety stock inventories can be reduced (Wisner et al., 2005, pp. 
208). Finally, in vendor-managed inventory, the vendor (supplier) takes on the 
responsibility of managing the buyer’s (retailer’s) inventory. Both agents can benefit 
from this arrangement. For example, the supplier takes the advantage of reduced 
forecast uncertainties, and hence safety stocks, while the retailer relieves from the 
responsibility of specifying, placing, and monitoring purchase orders and benefits 
from guaranteed service levels (Aviv and Federgruen, 1998).  
The scope of this thesis is the coordination of the inventory policies in a 
decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The 
system considered is a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple 
 3
independent suppliers and a manufacturer. The system operates in a manufacture-to-
order environment, i.e., the suppliers and the manufacturer employ make-to-stock 
and make-to-order strategies, respectively. The manufacturer orders each component 
from a particular supplier and production cannot start until all components arrive. 
The transfer times between the suppliers and the manufacturer are negligible. The 
inventory of each component at each supplier is controlled by an ( )1,S S−  base 
stock policy. The suppliers and the manufacturer have a limited capacity of 
production. Backorders are allowed in the system and capacity of the backlog queue 
at each supplier is infinite. End customer demand arrives in single units and it is 
stochastic.  
The aim of this thesis is to develop transfer payment contracts between the suppliers 
and the manufacturer, so that the suppliers choose the base stock levels that are 
optimal for the overall supply chain. In other words, the aim is to coordinate the 
inventory policies of the suppliers via contracts. To the best of our knowledge, the 
coordination of the inventory policies in a capacitated supply chain with multiple 
suppliers has not been explored yet.  
Figure 1.1 depicts the flow chart of the methodology used in this thesis. In summary, 
first, the supply chain is modeled as a queuing system since the suppliers and the 
manufacturer have a limited capacity of production. Afterwards, using the principles 
of queuing theory, the performance measures of the suppliers and the manufacturer 
are obtained. Then, the centralized and decentralized models are developed based on 
these performance measures. Comparison of the optimal solutions to these models 
reveals that the supply chain needs to be coordinated. Therefore, different transfer 
payment contracts are examined for the coordination of the supply chain; and each 
contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto 
improving or not. Finally, among these contracts, the one that can coordinate the 
supply chain and that is the most advantageous for all parties is suggested for the 
coordination of the supply chain in this thesis. 
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Figure 1.1: The flow chart of the methodology used in this thesis. 
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Figure 1.1 (continued): The flow chart of the methodology used in this thesis. 
The thesis is organized as follows. The supply chain contracting literature related to 
the coordination in decentralized supply chains with stochastic demand is reviewed 
in the first section of chapter two. Since the suppliers operate on a make-to-stock 
basis in the system considered, this is followed by a brief review of the literature on 
make-to-stock system models.  
In chapter three, the interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer in the case of 
one supplier and two suppliers are derived. Also, an approximate interarrival time 
distribution is developed for a system with two or more suppliers. Then, the supply 
chain is modeled as a queuing system and the following performance measures are 
obtained: The average outstanding backorders and the average inventory level of the 
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suppliers, the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system, and the average 
outstanding backorders at the manufacturer. 
In chapter four, using these performance measures, the centralized and decentralized 
models are developed; and the optimal solutions to these models are derived.  
Comparison of the centralized and decentralized solutions points out that the supply 
chain needs coordination. Therefore, in chapter five, three different transfer payment 
contracts are studied to coordinate the supply chain. These are the backorder cost 
subsidy contract, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and 
the cost sharing contract. Then, each contract is evaluated whether it can coordinate 
the supply chain and whether it is Pareto improving or not.  
Chapter six presents a numerical study. In this chapter, experimental designs are 
developed to compare the centralized and decentralized systems based on SCOR 
Model performance metrics, which are the total number of outstanding backorders, 
the order fulfillment lead time, the supply chain response time, the total backorder 
and holding costs, and the inventory days of supply. Then, the simple additive 
weighting method is used to decide which system is more preferable. Also, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the most sensitive criterion. 
Finally, the concluding remarks and the future research directions are given in 
chapter seven.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature related to the scope of this thesis can be analyzed in two parts. In the 
first part, the contracting literature concerned with the coordination of decentralized 
supply chains with stochastic demand is reviewed. This is followed by a brief review 
of the literature on models of make-to-stock systems, according to which the 
suppliers operate in the system taken into consideration. 
2.1 The Literature on Supply Chain Contracts 
The contracting literature on supply chains with stochastic demand can be mainly 
divided into two categories. Most of the research is on the coordination of supply 
chains in a single-period setting, i.e., the newsvendor model, and also its extensions. 
In the newsvendor model, generally there exists only one replenishment opportunity 
for the retailer. There are also relatively fewer studies on the coordination of supply 
chains in an infinite horizon setting with many replenishment opportunities.  
2.1.1 The newsvendor model and its extensions 
In the classical newsvendor model, there is a single supplier and a retailer. The 
retailer sells a single product and faces stochastic demand. There is just one 
opportunity for the retailer to order inventory from the supplier before the selling 
season begins. The decision variable is the order quantity of the retailer. In a 
decentralized system, since the retailer tries to minimize his own costs and does not 
take the supplier’s profit into consideration, he orders less inventory than the supply 
chain optimal order amount. Thus, an incentive scheme is needed for the retailer to 
increase his order quantity.  
In the literature, different contract types have been studied to coordinate this supply 
chain and its extensions. The most widely used ones are the wholesale-price contract, 
buyback contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity-discount contract, quantity-
flexibility contract, sales-rebate contract, and price-discount contract (Cachon, 2003). 
As the main scope of this thesis is the coordination of supply chains in an infinite 
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horizon setting, the research on the newsvendor model and its extensions is briefly 
reviewed below, giving a few examples for each contract type. 
2.1.1.1 Wholesale-price contract 
In the wholesale-price contract, the supplier determines a wholesale price per unit 
purchased by the retailer. However, because of double marginalization, this contract 
fails to coordinate the supply chain. Double marginalization was first discussed by 
Spengler (1950). It occurs when the supplier determines a wholesale price greater 
than his marginal costs and this gives rise to a retail price greater than the supply 
chain optimal price. Since there are two margins in this scheme, the supply chain 
cannot be coordinated. Coordination can only be achieved if the supplier has a 
nonpositive profit.  
Cachon (2004) examines three types of wholesale-price contracts for coordinating a 
supplier and a retailer. In the push contract, the retailer can submit an order before 
the selling season and there is a single wholesale price determined by the supplier. In 
the pull contract, the retailer can place an order during the selling season and again 
there is just one wholesale price. The third contract, which is the advance-purchase 
discount contract, has two wholesale prices. There is a discounted price for the orders 
given before the selling season starts and a regular price for the orders given during 
the season. It is shown that the advance-purchase discount contract may coordinate 
the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the profits between the supplier and the 
retailer. 
Debo and Sun (2005) study the coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer, 
where the retailer faces the repeated version of the single-period newsvendor model. 
In each period of an infinite horizon, before the demand is realized, the manufacturer 
and the retailer subsequently determine the wholesale price and the order quantity, 
respectively. Inventory carriage between the periods is not allowed. The authors 
point out that if the manufacturer and the retailer discount the future stream of profits 
with a sufficiently high factor, the coordination can be achieved using a wholesale-
price contract. 
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2.1.1.2 Buyback contract 
In the buyback contract, which is also called return policy, the supplier charges the 
retailer a wholesale price per unit purchased, but pays back the retailer an amount per 
unit for the units unsold at the end of the season. Obviously, this amount should not 
be greater than the wholesale price.  
Pasternack (1985) studies the buyback contracts in the newsvendor framework. He 
points out that the optimal solution cannot be obtained if the manufacturer offers the 
retailer full credit for all unsold units or refuses the return of unsold goods. He also 
shows that when the manufacturer offers a partial credit for unsold commodities, 
supply chain coordination can be achieved in a multi-retailer environment. 
Donohue (2000) extends the basic newsvendor model such that production can be 
performed in two different modes and demand forecast updating is possible. The 
selling season is divided into two periods. In the first period, demand predictions are 
uncertain. Nevertheless, demand forecast can be updated in the second period. The 
manufacturer can produce in two different modes: slow and fast. If the manufacturer 
produces in the slow mode, he should start the production in the first period since its 
lead time is long. However, production can also start in the second period in the fast 
mode, which is more expensive than slow production. In this study, it is found that a 
buyback contract with three parameters, which are a different wholesale price for 
each period and a return price, can coordinate the manufacturer and the distributor in 
this supply chain. 
2.1.1.3 Revenue-sharing contract 
Under a revenue-sharing contract, the supplier charges the retailer a wholesale price 
for each unit purchased and the retailer shares a percentage of his revenue with the 
supplier.  
Dana and Spier (2001) consider the revenue-sharing contracts in video rental 
industry with perfectly competitive multiple retailers. They demonstrate that a 
revenue-sharing contract, combined with a low purchasing price from the supplier, 
can coordinate the supply chain by softening the retail price competition and 
encouraging the retailers for holding inventory. 
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Cachon and Lariviere (2005) study the strengths and limitations of revenue-sharing 
contracts in a general supply chain model. They point out that if the retail price is 
fixed, the revenue-sharing contract is equivalent to the buyback contract. However, 
while the buyback contracts cannot coordinate the newsvendor model with price-
dependent demand, the revenue-sharing contracts satisfy coordination. The authors 
also show that a supply chain with multiple retailers competing on quantities can be 
coordinated using revenue-sharing contracts. Nevertheless, if retailers compete both 
on price and quantity, the supply chain cannot be coordinated. Another limitation of 
revenue-sharing contracts is their failure to coordinate a supply chain with effort-
dependent demand. 
2.1.1.4 Quantity-discount contract 
In the quantity-discount contract, the supplier reduces the wholesale price when the 
retailer’s purchase amount exceeds some quantity threshold. Two types of quantity 
discounts are generally used: all-units discount and incremental-units discount. In the 
former, the discount is applied to all units, whereas in the latter, the discount is 
applied only to the units above the threshold. 
In the newsvendor model with effort-dependent demand, the retailer takes some 
actions to increase the demand of customers. Cachon (2003) demonstrates that the 
quantity-discount contract can coordinate this supply chain since both the cost and 
benefit of the effort concern only the retailer. He also points out that a quantity-
discount contract can coordinate the newsvendor with both price-dependent and 
effort-dependent demand. In this case, since the retailer earns all the revenue, he 
optimizes the price and the effort. As the quantity-discount schedule is contingent on 
the optimal price and effort, the quantity decision is not distorted and the supply 
chain is coordinated.  
Weng (2004) studies the coordination of the generalized newsvendor model with the 
objective of maximizing the system’s expected profit. He develops quantity-discount 
policies for encouraging the buyer to order the coordinated quantity. He shows that 
the most important result of coordination is the reduction of the operating costs. Due 
to this reduction, the expected profit of the system is increased through coordination. 
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2.1.1.5 Quantity-flexibility contract 
Under the quantity-flexibility contract, the supplier charges a wholesale price per 
unit purchased and gives the retailer full refund for a specified amount of unsold 
units. Quantity-flexibility contract differs from the buyback contract in that the 
former gives full protection on a specified portion of the retailer’s order, whereas 
since the buyback price is smaller than the wholesale price, the latter partially 
protects the retailer’s entire order (Cachon, 2003). 
Tsay (1999) considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The 
retailer provides a planning forecast of his intended purchase, but does not have to 
comply with his plan. Thus, he has the incentive of over forecasting his purchase 
amount to increase the manufacturer’s production quantity. This behavior can also be 
anticipated by the manufacturer. The author uses a quantity-flexibility contract to 
coordinate such an inefficient supply chain. In the contract, the retailer commits not 
to purchase less than a certain percentage below his forecast and the manufacturer 
guarantees to deliver up to a certain percentage above. The author shows that supply 
chain coordination can be achieved with this contract under certain conditions. 
Wu (2005) studies the coordination of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer 
and a retailer under a quantity-flexibility contract. In this model, the retailer shares 
his demand forecast with the manufacturer. Accordingly, the manufacturer decides 
the production capacity. Then, using the Bayesian procedure, the retailer updates the 
demand information and commits on the purchase amount, which is constrained by 
the negotiated flexibility and the manufacturer’s production capacity. The results 
denote that the retailer prefers more quantity flexibility, whereas the manufacturer 
usually benefits from smaller flexibility. Under the quantity-flexibility contract with 
Bayesian updating procedure, the manufacturer and the retailer can share the benefits 
from information updating. 
2.1.1.6 Sales-rebate contract 
In the sales-rebate contract, the supplier charges a wholesale price for each unit 
purchased and pays the retailer a rebate per unit sold beyond a specified target level. 
This is called target rebate. There are also linear rebates, in which the rebate is paid 
for each unit sold. 
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Taylor (2002) studies supply chain coordination with sales-rebate contracts. He 
points out that when demand is not effort-dependent, a target sales-rebate contract 
can ensure coordination and both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit. 
Nevertheless, coordination cannot be achieved with a linear rebate contract since the 
retailer can increase his marginal revenue but the manufacturer bears the entire 
financial burden. The author also examines coordination with effort-dependent 
demand and finds that the supply chain can be coordinated under a properly designed 
target sales-rebate contract and buyback contract. However, these contracts cannot 
ensure coordination alone. In addition, both members can benefit under the defined 
scheme. 
Zhang et al. (2005) consider the coordination of a loss-averse newsvendor. They 
examine several contracts, one of which is the target sales-rebate contract. They 
point out that the allocation of the profits is influenced by the retailer’s risk 
preference when target sales-rebate contract is used. If the retailer is loss-averse, 
selecting the parameters of the contract is burdensome. Furthermore, since the 
retailer’s profit will decline quickly without an effort to increase the demand, he will 
exert more effort under this contract. 
2.1.1.7 Price-discount contract 
Similar to the buyback contract, the price-discount contract has a wholesale price and 
a buyback rate. These contracts differ in that the contract terms are conditional on the 
chosen retail price in the price-discount contract (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) study the coordination of a supply chain with a 
single supplier and multiple retailers with price-dependent demand. The authors 
examine both the competing and noncompeting retailer cases. They show that with a 
linear price-discount contract, the supply chain can be coordinated when the retailers 
are noncompeting. In the case of competitive retailers, coordination can also be 
achieved using the price-discount scheme by adding a nonlinear component. 
The discriminating and important features of the studies mentioned in this part are 
displayed in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Research on the newsvendor model and its extensions. 
Reference 
Number of 
upstream 
stage 
members 
Number of 
downstream 
stage 
members 
Contract type Additional features 
Cachon (2004) 1 1 Wholesale-price Many replenishment opportunities in a season 
Debo and Sun (2005) 1 1 Wholesale-price Repeated version 
Pasternack (1985) 1 Multiple Buyback - 
Donohue (2000) 1 1 Buyback Two-mode production Demand forecast updating 
Dana and Spier (2001) 1 Multiple Revenue-sharing Perfectly competitive multiple retailers 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) 1 1/Multiple Revenue-sharing Price-dependent demand Multiple retailers competing on quantities 
Cachon (2003) 1 1 Quantity-discount Price-dependent and effort-dependent demand 
Weng (2004) 1 1 Quantity-discount - 
Tsay (1999) 1 1 Quantity-flexibility Demand forecast sharing 
Wu (2005) 1 1 Quantity-flexibility Demand forecast sharing Bayesian updating 
Taylor (2002) 1 1 Sales-rebate Effort-dependent demand 
Zhang et al. (2005) 1 1 Sales-rebate Loss-averse newsvendor 
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) 1 Multiple Price-discount Price-dependent demand Competing/Noncompeting multiple retailers 
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In summary, there are several studies on the newsvendor model and its extensions in 
the literature. All the studies mentioned in this part consider a two-stage supply chain 
with a single upstream stage member, whereas the numbers of downstream stage 
members differ in the studies. All the studies are based on the newsvendor model, 
but they also have different additional features as given in Table 2.1. Moreover, they 
consider different contract types for the coordination of the supply chain.  
Recall that the newsvendor model and its extensions are not in the main scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the studies belonging to this area have some similarities with 
this thesis such that they also investigate the coordination of the supply chain via 
contracts and they also consider stochastic demand.  
2.1.2 Stochastic models in an infinite horizon setting  
The literature on stochastic models in an infinite horizon setting that investigates the 
coordination of the inventory policies in a decentralized supply chain can be mainly 
analyzed in two groups. Some of the studies consider an uncapacitated supply system 
and some of them deal with capacitated supply chains. 
2.1.2.1 Uncapacitated supply chain 
Lee and Whang (1999) study the coordination of decentralized multi-echelon supply 
chains. For the centralized multi-echelon inventory problem, Clark and Scarf (1960) 
define the optimal policy for finite planning horizons. They show that for a series 
system with uncertain demand, the echelon inventory order-up-to policy applied at 
each installation is optimal. In this policy, each installation always orders up to bring 
its echelon inventory position to the order-up-to level. Extension of these results for 
infinite horizons is performed by Federgruen and Zipkin (1984). However, since 
these results are valid for a centralized system, it is not possible to use them directly 
for a decentralized multi-echelon supply chain. In the model of Lee and Whang 
(1999), the members of the supply chain use echelon inventory order-up-to policies. 
Only the last downstream member is charged a backorder cost for not filling a 
customer order on time. Thus, upstream members are reluctant to hold stocks and the 
last downstream member has to account for carrying extra inventories. Since the end 
products incur the highest inventory holding costs, such a system is inefficient. The 
authors develop a nonlinear transfer payment contract to align the incentives of the 
different members in the supply chain. 
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Chen (1999) considers a decentralized multi-echelon supply chain subject to material 
and information delays. Each member in the supply chain is charged an inventory 
holding cost, but the backorder cost is incurred only at the last downstream member 
as in the model of Lee and Whang (1999). Although the members are from the same 
firm, they can only access to local inventory information. The author finds that it is 
optimal for each member to follow an installation base stock policy, i.e., installation 
inventory order-up-to policy, in which each stage orders up to bring its installation 
inventory position to the order-up-to level. The author then defines a linear incentive 
alignment scheme based on accounting inventory levels such that the system optimal 
solution also optimizes each member’s own system.  
Cachon and Zipkin (1999) investigate a two-stage serial supply chain consisting of a 
supplier and a retailer. Both members are charged their own holding costs and they 
share the backorder cost for not filling a customer order on time. Base stock policy is 
applied at both stages. The authors use a game-theoretic approach and consider two 
non-cooperative games: echelon inventory game and local inventory game. In the 
former, the firms track echelon inventory, whereas in the latter, they track local 
inventory. In both games, the supplier and the retailer simultaneously choose their 
base stock levels. Since it is found that the optimal solution is not a Nash 
equilibrium, the authors prepare a set of linear contracts such that the Nash 
equilibrium is same as the optimal solution, thus eliminating each member’s 
incentive to deviate from the optimal strategy. The authors also study two 
Stackelberg games, in one of which the supplier is the leader and in the other one, the 
retailer is the leader.  
Finally, Cachon (2001) studies a two-stage supply chain with a single supplier and 
multiple retailers. Both the supplier and the retailers hold inventory managed by 
reorder point policy. Each member is charged a holding cost for his own inventory 
and also a backorder cost. The author uses a game-theoretic approach and considers a 
supermodular game. As it is proved that the optimal reorder points are frequently not 
a Nash equilibrium, a coordination mechanism is needed. The author studies 
different coordination strategies: a set of contracts to change the players’ incentives 
so that the optimal solution is a Nash equilibrium; switching to the lowest cost 
equilibrium when there are multiple Nash equilibria; and giving all control to the
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supplier by letting him to choose all reorder points. Among these strategies, only the 
equilibrium change does not guarantee the optimal solution.  
2.1.2.2 Capacitated supply chain 
Cachon (1999) examines a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a capacitated 
supplier and a retailer. Both stages can hold inventory and have their own holding 
costs. The supplier and the retailer use a base stock policy to manage their 
inventories. The transfer times between the supplier and the retailer are negligible. 
Backorders are not allowed in the system. Thus, assuming independent, Poisson 
distributed demand and independent, exponentially distributed processing times, the 
system is modeled as an / /1/M M c  make-to-stock queue. To analyze the 
decentralized system, the author considers a non-cooperative game, in which both the 
supplier and the retailer choose their base stock levels simultaneously. Since the 
Nash equilibrium is not identical to the optimal solution, the author investigates 
several contracts to coordinate the supply chain. The contracts contain one or more 
of the following elements: a retailer holding cost subsidy; a lost sales transfer 
payment; and inventory holding cost sharing. It is found that the most effective 
contract includes both a lost sales transfer payment and inventory holding cost 
sharing.  
Caldentey and Wein (2003) study the coordination of a decentralized supply chain 
consisting of a capacitated supplier and a retailer. The finished goods inventory is 
carried by the retailer. The retailer specifies his inventory policy and the supplier 
chooses the capacity of his manufacturing facility. The retailer is charged a holding 
cost; the supplier is charged a cost for building capacity; and backorder cost is shared 
between them. The order cost is negligible in the model, thus the retailer uses an 
( )1,S S−  base stock policy. Under necessary assumptions, the supplier’s production 
facility is modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue with a continuous-state 
approximation. The main difference between this model and the model of Cachon 
and Zipkin (1999) is that the production process is an infinite-server queue in the 
former since the supplier is uncapacitated, whereas a single-server queue in the latter. 
Similar to the study of Cachon and Zipkin (1999), Caldentey and Wein (2003) also 
use a game-theoretic framework by considering a non-cooperative game between the 
supplier and the retailer, where the retailer chooses his base stock level and the 
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supplier chooses his capacity, simultaneously. As the Nash equilibrium is not equal 
to the optimal solution, the authors develop linear transfer payment schemes to 
coordinate the supply chain and they also study Stackelberg games. 
Jemaï and Karaesmen (2004) investigate a decentralized supply chain consisting of a 
capacitated manufacturer and a retailer. Both members may keep inventory managed 
by base stock policy. Each member is responsible for his own holding cost and 
backorder cost is shared between them. As in Cachon (1999), the transportation 
times between the manufacturer and the retailer are negligible. With this assumption, 
rather than inventory positioning, pure inventory ownership becomes the focus of 
this study. Then, the system can be modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue 
assuming that the necessary conditions are satisfied. In contrast to the study of 
Caldentey and Wein (2003), a discrete-state space model is employed. The authors 
use a game-theoretic approach in this study. They investigate a non-cooperative 
game in which both members choose their base stock levels and they also examine 
Stackelberg games. It is found that the system is not coordinated at the Nash 
equilibrium except under special cases and a set of simple linear contracts are studied 
to coordinate the system.  
Finally, Gupta and Weerawat (2006) study a manufacture-to-order system consisting 
of a component supplier and a manufacturer, which are make-to-stock and make-to-
order systems, respectively. Processing is required at both stages, distinguishing the 
manufacturer from a retailer. Both the supplier and the manufacturer have production 
capacities. Backorders are allowed in the model. The supplier employs a base stock 
policy and the only decision variable is the base stock level of the supplier. Under 
necessary conditions, the supplier is modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue. 
Although the arrival of components to the manufacturer is not a renewal process, the 
manufacturer is also approximated as an / /1M M  queue to incorporate the 
congestion effects at the manufacturer’s production facility. In this study, three 
different revenue functions are defined. In the first function, revenue is a linear 
function of realized (or average) lead time. The second function models quoted lead 
time and the third one models lost sales. The authors develop three different 
contracts for the coordination of the decentralized model. These are fixed-markup 
contract, simple revenue-sharing contract, and two-part revenue-sharing contract. In 
the simple revenue-sharing contract, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg game 
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leader. He chooses the revenue-fraction first, and then the supplier chooses the base 
stock level. The authors refer to this contract as the Stackelberg equilibrium contract 
and use it as a benchmark. The results denote that for each of the revenue functions, 
the two-part revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain.  
The distinctive and important features of the studies mentioned in this part are given 
in Table 2.2.  
In summary, there is a limited number of studies on stochastic models in an infinite 
horizon setting that investigate the coordination of the inventory policies in a 
decentralized supply chain. Some of these studies consider an uncapacitated supply 
system and some of them deal with capacitated supply chains. 
Among the studies that consider an uncapacitated supply system, some of them deal 
with multi-echelon supply chains, whereas some of them are interested in two-stage 
systems. Backorders are allowed in the system in all studies. Therefore, a lost sales 
model seems to be missing in this area. Only the studies that consider a two-stage 
supply chain use a game theoretic framework. Thus, a further research area can be to 
incorporate game theory in a multi-echelon system. Finally, the studies use different 
inventory control policies and investigate different contracts to coordinate the supply 
chain. 
All the studies that deal with a capacitated system consider a two-stage supply chain 
with a single member at each stage. The other similarities between these studies are 
given as follows: The base stock policy is selected as the inventory control policy; a 
game theoretic framework is used in the models; and the capacitated member or 
members are modeled using queuing theory. In some of the studies both members 
hold inventory, whereas in some of them only one of the members holds inventory. 
There are models that consider lost sales and/or allowed backorders. Finally, the 
studies investigate different contracts to coordinate the supply chain. Consequently, a 
system consisting of multiple members at one of the stages of the supply chain is 
missing in this area. This thesis fills that gap in the literature by considering multiple 
suppliers in the system as presented in Table 2.2. 
 
 19
Table 2.2: Research on stochastic models in an infinite horizon setting. 
Reference 
Number of 
upstream 
stage 
members 
Number of 
downstream 
stage 
members 
Capacity type Inventory control policy 
Game theoretic 
extension Queuing model Contract type Additional features 
Lee and Whang 
(1999) Multi-echelon Uncapacitated 
Echelon inventory 
order-up-to policy - - 
Nonlinear transfer 
payment Backorders allowed 
Chen (1999) Multi-echelon Uncapacitated 
Installation 
inventory order-
up-to policy 
- - 
Linear incentive 
alignment scheme based 
on accounting inventory 
levels 
Backorders allowed 
Cachon and Zipkin 
(1999) 1 1 Uncapacitated Base stock policy 
Non-cooperative 
Stackelberg - Linear transfer payment 
Backorders allowed 
Both members hold inventory 
Both members choose base stock levels 
Cachon (2001) 1 Multiple Uncapacitated Reorder point policy Supermodular - 
Three different 
coordination strategies 
Backorders allowed 
All members hold inventory 
All members choose reorder points 
Cachon (1999) 1 1 Capacitated Base stock policy Non-cooperative / /1 /M M c  make-to-
stock queue 
A contract including a 
lost sales transfer 
payment and inventory 
holding cost sharing 
Lost sales 
Both members choose base stock levels 
Caldentey and Wein 
(2003) 1 1 Capacitated Base stock policy 
Non-cooperative 
Stackelberg 
/ /1M M  make-to-
stock queue 
(continuous-state 
approximation) 
Linear transfer payment 
Backorders allowed 
Only retailer holds inventory 
Retailer chooses base stock level 
Supplier chooses capacity 
Jemaï and 
Karaesmen (2004) 1 1 Capacitated Base stock policy 
Non-cooperative 
Stackelberg 
/ /1M M  make-to-
stock queue (discrete-
state space) 
Linear transfer payment Backorders allowed Both members choose base stock levels 
Gupta and 
Weerawat (2006) 1 1 Capacitated Base stock policy Stackelberg 
Supplier: / /1M M  
make-to-stock queue 
Manufacturer: 
/ /1M M  queue 
Two-part revenue-
sharing contract 
Backorders allowed / Lost sales 
Manufacture-to-order system 
Revenue is a function of lead time 
This thesis Multiple 1 Capacitated Base stock policy - 
Suppliers: / / 1M M  
make-to-stock queues 
Manufacturer: 
/ / 1GI M  queue 
Three different 
transfer payment 
contracts 
Backorders allowed 
Manufacture-to-order system 
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In the system considered, the suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis. Therefore, 
the literature on make-to-stock system models is briefly reviewed in the following 
section. 
2.2 The Literature on Make-to-Stock System Models 
The models of make-to-stock systems have been investigated in the literature 
especially in the last two decades. Most of the studies use approximations to model 
queuing networks consisting of make-to-stock queues.  
Lee and Zipkin (1992) study a tandem queuing model, in which each stage holds its 
own inventory. In other words, their system is a tandem queuing network consisting 
of make-to-stock queues. Base stock policy is applied at each stage. Assuming that 
demands occur according to a Poisson process and unit production times are 
exponentially distributed, the authors approximate the point process describing the 
release of units from a stage by a Poisson process. Then, each stage behaves like an 
/ /1M M  queue. They also define some performance measures such as average 
customer backorders outstanding, average work-in-process inventory, and average 
finished-goods inventory. Comparing the approximation estimates with the 
simulation results for two-stage and three-stage systems, they conclude that the 
approximation appears to be quite accurate. 
Buzacott et al. (1992) investigate a manufacturing system consisting of a number of 
stages in series. Each stage holds inventory and has limited capacity. The authors 
consider both MRP and base stock policy to initiate the work release to each stage. 
Based on a sample path analysis, they develop bounds and approximations for 
shipment delays. Under the assumptions of Poisson demand process and exponential 
service times, they approximate the congestion at the second stage of a two-stage 
base stock system using an / /1M M  queue. The authors also derive the distribution 
of the time between releases to the second stage and they develop an alternative 
approximation using a / /1GI M  queuing model. Comparing the estimates of 
/ /1M M  and / /1GI M  approximations with the simulation results denotes that the 
/ /1GI M  queuing model improves the accuracy of the predictions. 
Bai et al. (2004) derive the interdeparture time distributions for make-to-stock 
queues controlled via base stock policy, i.e., base stock inventory queues. Using 
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Palm probabilities, they relate the distribution of interdeparture times to residual 
arrival time of demands and residual time for a production completion. The main 
findings of their study are the interdeparture time probability distributions and 
squared coefficient of variations for the base stock inventory queues with birth and 
death production processes, such as / /1,M M  / / ,M M c  and / /M M ∞  inventory 
queues. 
Finally, Gupta and Selvaraju (2006) study capacitated serial supply systems, in 
which each stage holds inventory managed according to a base stock policy. The 
authors propose a modification to the approximations of Lee and Zipkin (1992) and 
Buzacott et al. (1992). Based on their approximation, they derive performance 
measures such as average number of units that need to be processed at the second 
stage, average inventory at each stage, and average number of backorders 
outstanding for a two-stage system. They also investigate systems with more than 
two stages. The authors then define a near-exact matrix-geometric procedure to 
compare their approximation with the others. Numerical tests denote that their 
approximation gives better results. They also study the optimization of the policy 
parameters. 
To summarize, the supply chain contracting literature related to the coordination in 
decentralized supply chains with stochastic demand and the literature on make-to-
stock system models have been reviewed in this chapter. After reviewing the 
literature, the study on the coordination of the decentralized supply chain begins by 
modeling each member as a queuing system. The queuing model is presented in the 
next chapter. 
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3. THE QUEUING MODEL 
The supply chain considered in this thesis has two stages consisting of multiple 
independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. Let the 
number of suppliers be n, where 2.n ≥  The suppliers operate on a make-to-stock 
basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. Let iS  be the base 
stock level of supplier i for 1, , .i n= …  No inventory is held by the manufacturer, i.e., 
the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy.  
In the system taken into consideration, the end customer demands occur according to 
a Poisson process with rate .λ  The service times of supplier i are independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables having an exponential distribution 
with rate iµ  for 1, , .i n= …  The manufacturer has also i.i.d. and exponentially 
distributed service times with rate .Mµ  Let iρ  and Mρ  be the traffic intensity of 
supplier i and the manufacturer, respectively, where traffic intensity can be defined 
as the ratio of the arrival rate to the service rate. For the stability of the system, it is 
assumed that 0 1iρ< <  for all 1, ,i n= …  and 0 1.Mρ< <  See Appendix A for a 
complete list of all assumptions made in this thesis. 
Under the conditions defined above, each supplier can be modeled as an / /1M M  
make-to-stock queue. On the other hand, the interarrival time distribution of the 
manufacturer has to be derived to model the manufacturer as a queuing system. This 
distribution is obtained by Buzacott et al. (1992) in the case of a single supplier.  
In the following part, the derivation of the manufacturer’s interarrival time 
distribution for a system with one supplier is represented in a similar way to the 
study of Buzacott et al. (1992). In addition, the interarrival time distribution in the 
case of two suppliers is derived. Also, an approximate distribution is developed for a 
system with two or more suppliers.  
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3.1 Interarrival Time Distribution of the Manufacturer 
3.1.1 Exact distribution in the case of one supplier 
In the general case, let ( )iN t  be the number of jobs in supplier i’s system at time t; 
( )iI t  be the inventory level of supplier i at time t; and ( )iB t  be the outstanding 
backorders at supplier i at time t for 1, , .i n= …  Under the previously defined 
conditions, the first stage of the supply chain behaves like an / /1M M  queue. Then, 
the number of jobs in supplier i’s system ( ){ }, 0iN t t ≥  forms a birth and death 
process. Solving the probability flow balance equations, we obtain 
( ) ( ){ } ( )lim 1 , 1, , , 0,1, ,i mm i i itP P N t m i n mρ ρ→∞= = = − = =… …  (3.1) 
where ( )imP  denotes the steady-state probability that the number of jobs in supplier i’s 
system is equal to m. 
In the case of one supplier, i.e., 1,i =  the supplier can be in one of the three states 
immediately after a component has been released to the manufacturer: ( )1 10 ;I t S< <  
( ) ( )1 1 0;I t B t= =  and ( )1 0.B t >  To find the distribution of the interdeparture times 
of the supplier, i.e., the interarrival times of the manufacturer, the steady-state 
probabilities of these three states have to be calculated first. 
Lemma 3.1. In the case of one supplier, the states ( )1 10 ,I t S< <  ( ) ( )1 1 0,I t B t= =  
and ( )1 0B t >  immediately after a component has been released to the manufacturer 
have the steady-state probabilities ( ).pi  given by 
( )
1
1 1
1
10 1 ,
S
I t Spi ρ −< < = −  (3.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 121 10 1 ,SI t B tpi ρ ρ −= = = −  (3.3) 
and 
( ) 11
1
10 ,
S
B tpi ρ +> =  (3.4) 
respectively. 
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Proof. Let event D denote the departure of a component from the supplier. Then, 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
{ }
( )
1 1
1
1
1 10
1 1
1 1
11
1
1
1
1
lim 0 |
lim 0 |
0 ,
lim
1 ,
I t S t
t
t
S
m
m
S
P I t S D
P N t S D
P N t S D
P D
P
pi
λ
λ
ρ
< < →∞
→∞
→∞
−
−
=
−
= < <
= < <
< <
=
=
= −
∑
  
proving equation (3.2).  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
{ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1
1 10
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
12
1 1
lim 0 |
lim |
,
lim
1 ,
I t B t t
t
t
S S
S
P I t B t D
P N t S D
P N t S D
P D
P P
pi
λ µ
λ
ρ ρ
= = →∞
→∞
→∞
− +
−
= = =
= =
=
=
+
=
= −
 
proving equation (3.3). Finally, 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
{ }
( )
1
1
1
10
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1
lim 0 |
lim 1|
1,
lim
,
B t t
t
t
m
m S
S
P B t D
P N t S D
P N t S D
P D
P
pi
µ
λ
ρ
> →∞
→∞
→∞
∞
+
= +
+
= >
= ≥ +
≥ +
=
=
=
∑
 
proving equation (3.4). Thus, the proof of Lemma 3.1 is completed.   □ 
Theorem 3.1. In the case of one supplier, the probability density function ( ) ( ).f t  of 
the interdeparture times of the supplier, i.e., the interarrival times of the 
manufacturer, is given by 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 1 11 1 121 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,tS t S StAf t e e e λ µµλλ ρ µ ρ λ µ ρ ρ− ++ − − −−= − + − + −  (3.5) 
where A denotes the interarrival time of the manufacturer. 
Proof. Recall that the single supplier can be in one of the three states just after a 
component has been released to the manufacturer. If ( )1 10 I t S< <  immediately after 
a release, the time to the next release equals to the time between demands. In the 
( ) ( )1 1 0I t B t= =  case, the next release occurs after the maximum of time between 
demands and time until the next service completion. Finally, if ( )1 0,B t >  the time to 
the next release is equal to the time until the next service finishes.  
Now, let X denote the time between demands and iY  denote the time until the next 
service completion for supplier i, where 1, , .i n= …  Then, the probability density 
functions of X and iY  are 
( ) tXf t e λλ −=  (3.6) 
and  
( ) , 1, , ,i
i
t
Y if t e i nµµ −= = …  (3.7) 
respectively. Assuming independence between X and ,iY  the probability density 
function of their maximum can be calculated as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max , , 1, , .iii ttt i iX Yf t e e e i nλ µµλλ µ λ µ − +−−= + − + = …  (3.8) 
Accordingly, in the case of one supplier, the interarrival times of the manufacturer 
have the probability density function given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 1 1 1 10 max , 0 0.A X YI t S X Y I t B t B tf t f t f t f tpi pi pi< < = = >= + +  (3.9) 
Substituting equations (3.2)-(3.4) and (3.6)-(3.8) into equation (3.9) completes the 
proof of Theorem 3.1.   □ 
From equation (3.5), the expected value of the interarrival times of the manufacturer 
is calculated as 
[ ] 1 ,E A λ=  (3.10) 
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and the variance is 
( ) 1 1 112
1
11Var 1 2 .
1
SA ρρλ ρ
+ −
= − 
+ 
 (3.11) 
Hence, the squared coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the variance to the 
square of the expected value, is given by 
1 12 1
1
1
11 2 .
1
S
AC
ρρ
ρ
+ −
= −
+
 (3.12) 
3.1.2 Exact distribution in the case of two suppliers 
In the case of two suppliers, the suppliers can be in one of the thirteen states 
immediately after both components have been released to the manufacturer. These 
states, their steady-state probabilities, and the time to the next release in each case 
are given below. While calculating the steady-state probabilities, the states of the 
suppliers are assumed to be conditionally independent from each other given both 
components have been departed from the suppliers. 
i. For state ( ) ( )1 1 2, 0,I t S B t= >  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2
2
2
1 1 2, 0
1 2 2
2
1 2 1
0
1
1
1 2
lim , 0 |
lim 0, 1|
1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ
= > →∞
→∞
∞
+
= +
+
= = >
= = ≥ +
=
= −
∑
I t S B t t
t
m
m S
S
P I t S B t D
P N t N t S D
PP
 (3.13) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 2.Y  
ii. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2, 0,I t S I t B t= = =  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 2 2
2
2
1 1 2 2, 0
1 2 2
2
2 11
0
1 2 2
lim , 0 |
lim 0, |
1 1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ ρ
= = = →∞
→∞
+
= = = =
= = =
=
= − −
I t S I t B t t
t
S
S
P I t S I t B t D
P N t N t S D
P
P
 (3.14) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of X and 2.Y   
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iii. For state ( ) ( )1 1 2 20 ,0 ,I t S I t S< < < <  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 2
1 1 2 20 ,0
1 1 2 2
1 21 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
lim 0 ,0 |
lim 0 ,0 |
1 1 ,
pi
λ λ
λ λ
ρ ρ
< < < < →∞
→∞
− −
− −
= =
− −
= < < < <
= < < < <
=
= − −
∑ ∑
I t S I t S t
t
S S
m m
m m
S S
P I t S I t S D
P N t S N t S D
P P  (3.15) 
and the time to the next release is equal to X. 
iv. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 20 , 0,I t S I t B t< < = =  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 20 , 0
1 1 2 2
2 211 1
1 2 111
1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
lim 0 , 0 |
lim 0 , |
1 1 1 1 ,
pi
λ µλ
λ λ λ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
< < = = →∞
→∞
− −
− +
−
= =
− − −
= < < = =
= < < =
= +
= − − + − −
∑ ∑
I t S I t B t t
t
S S
S Sm
m
m m
S S S S
P I t S I t B t D
P N t S N t S D
P PP P
 (3.16) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of X and 2.Y   
v. For state ( ) ( )1 1 20 , 0,I t S B t< < >  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2
1
2
1 2
1 1 20 , 0
1 1 2 2
21
1 2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 2
lim 0 , 0 |
lim 0 , 1|
1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ ρ
< < > →∞
→∞
− ∞
+
= = +
− +
= < < >
= < < ≥ +
=
= −
∑ ∑
I t S B t t
t
S
m
m
m m S
S S
P I t S B t D
P N t S N t S D
PP
 (3.17) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 2.Y  
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vi. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 20,0 ,I t B t I t S= = < <  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 20,0
1 1 2 2
1 121 1
1 1 1 21
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 2
lim 0,0 |
lim ,0 |
1 1 1 1 ,
pi
λ µλ
λ λ λ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
= = < < →∞
→∞
− −
− +
−
= =
− − −
= = = < <
= = < <
= +
= − − + − −
∑ ∑
I t B t I t S t
t
S S
S Sm
m
m m
S S S S
P I t B t I t S D
P N t S N t S D
P PP P
 (3.18) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of X and 1.Y  
vii. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 20, ,I t B t I t S= = =  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1
1
1 1 2 20,
1 1 2
1
1 1 2
0
1 1 2
lim 0, |
lim , 0 |
1 1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ ρ
= = = →∞
→∞
+
= = = =
= = =
=
= − −
I t B t I t S t
t
S
S
P I t B t I t S D
P N t S N t D
P
P
 (3.19) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of X and 1.Y   
viii. For state ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 20, 0,I t B t I t B t= = = =  the steady-state probability is given 
by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 20, 0
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
lim 0, 0 |
lim , |
1 1 1 1 ,
pi
λ λ µ µ
λ λ λ λ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
= = = = →∞
→∞
− − + +
− −
= = = = =
= = =
= +
= − − + − −
I t B t I t B t t
t
S S S S
S S S S
P I t B t I t B t D
P N t S N t S D
P P P P  (3.20) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of X, 1,Y  and 2.Y  
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ix. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 20, 0,I t B t B t= = >  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2
1
2
1 2
1 1 20, 0
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 1
1
1
1 1 2
lim 0, 0 |
lim , 1|
1 ,
pi
µ µ
λ λ
ρ ρ ρ
= = > →∞
→∞
∞
+ +
= +
+
= = = >
= = ≥ +
=
= −
∑
I t B t B t t
t
S m
m S
S S
P I t B t B t D
P N t S N t S D
P P  (3.21) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 2.Y  
x. For state ( ) ( )1 2 20,0 ,B t I t S> < <  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2
2
1
1 2
1 2 20,0
1 1 2 2
1 1
21 1
1 1
1 1
1 2 2
lim 0,0 |
lim 1,0 |
1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ ρ
> < < →∞
→∞
−∞
+
= + =
+ −
= > < <
= ≥ + < <
=
= −
∑ ∑
B t I t S t
t
S
m
m
m S m
S S
P B t I t S D
P N t S N t S D
P P
 (3.22) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 1.Y  
xi. For state ( ) ( )1 2 20, ,B t I t S> =  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2
1
1
1 2 20,
1 1 2
1
21 1
0
1
1
1 2
lim 0, |
lim 1, 0 |
1 ,
pi
µ
λ
ρ ρ
> = →∞
→∞
∞
+
= +
+
= > =
= ≥ + =
=
= −
∑
B t I t S t
t
m
m S
S
P B t I t S D
P N t S N t D
P P
 (3.23) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 1.Y  
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xii. For state ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 20, 0,B t I t B t> = =  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 2
2
1
1 2
1 2 20, 0
1 1 2 2
21
2 11 1
1
1
1 2 2
lim 0, 0 |
lim 1, |
1 ,
pi
µµ
λ λ
ρ ρ ρ
> = = →∞
→∞
∞
++
= +
+
= > = =
= ≥ + =
=
= −
∑
B t I t B t t
t
Sm
m S
S S
P B t I t B t D
P N t S N t S D
PP  (3.24) 
and the time to the next release is equal to 1.Y  
xiii. For state ( ) ( )1 20, 0,B t B t> >  the steady-state probability is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 20, 0
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
lim 0, 0 |
lim 1, 1|
,
pi
µ µ
λ λ
ρ ρ
> > →∞
→∞
∞ ∞
+ +
= + = +
+ +
= > >
= ≥ + ≥ +
=
=
∑ ∑
B t B t t
t
m m
m S m S
S S
P B t B t D
P N t S N t S D
P P  (3.25) 
and the time to the next release is equal to the maximum of 1Y  and 2.Y   
Theorem 3.2. In the case of two suppliers, the probability density function of the 
interarrival times of the manufacturer is given by 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 1 2
2 2 1
1 1 2
2 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 1
1 2
1
1 1 1 2 1 2
1
2 2 2 1 1 2
1 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2
1 2
2 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
S St
A
t S S
t S S
t S S
t S S
t S S
f t e
e
e
e
e
e
λ
µ
µ
λ µ
λ µ
µ µ
λ ρ ρ
µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
λ µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
λ µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
µ µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ +−
− −
− −
− +
−
− +
−
− +
− −
= − −
+ + − +
+ + − +
− + − + − +
− + − + − +
− + − − +( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2 1 2
2 2
2 1 2
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21 1 1 .
t S S
e
λ µ µ
ρ ρ
λ µ µ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ− + + − −
+
+ + + − − +
 (3.26) 
Proof. The probability density functions of X, ,iY  and their maximum are as given in 
equations (3.6)-(3.8), where 1,2i =  in the case of two suppliers. In addition, the 
probability density function of the maximum of 1Y  and 2Y  is calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 21 2 1 2 1 2max , ,tt tY Yf t e e e µ µµ µµ µ µ µ − +− −= + − +  (3.27) 
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and the probability density function of the maximum of X, 1,Y  and 2Y  is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 21 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2max , ,
1 2 1 2 ,
t tt tt
X Y Y
t t
f t e e e e e
e e
λ µ λ µµ µλ
µ µ λ µ µ
λ µ µ λ µ λ µ
µ µ λ µ µ
− + − +
− −−
− + − + +
= + + − + − +
− + + + +
 (3.28) 
assuming that X and 'iY s are independent from each other. Then, similar to the proof 
of Theorem 3.1, using equations (3.13)-(3.25) and the probability density functions 
of the time to the next release for each case, it is not difficult to show that the 
interarrival times of the manufacturer have the probability density function as given 
in equation (3.26).   □ 
3.1.3 The approximate distribution 
Deriving the distribution of the interarrival times of the manufacturer becomes 
mathematically intractable as the number of suppliers gets larger. This brings forth 
the need of an approximate distribution.  
The manufacturer cannot start production until all components arrive. Hence, the 
supplier with the minimum base stock level is expected to affect the interarrival 
times of the manufacturer the most. Thus, inspired by Theorem 3.1, an appropriate 
approximation for the probability density function of the interarrival times of the 
manufacturer can be given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 121 1 ,jj j j jtS t S StA j j j j j jf t e e e λ µµλλ ρ µ ρ λ µ ρ ρ− ++ − − −− − + − + −≃  (3.29) 
where supplier j is the one with the minimum base stock level among all suppliers1, 
i.e., 
1, ,
arg min ;i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 jρ  is the traffic intensity of supplier j; and jµ  is the service rate 
of supplier j.  
Then, from equation (3.29), the approximate squared coefficient of variation is 
calculated as 
12 11 2 .
1
jS j
A j
j
C
ρρ
ρ
+ −
−
+
≃  (3.30) 
 
                                               
1
 If more than one supplier has the minimum base stock level, then supplier j is the one having the 
highest traffic intensity among these suppliers. 
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For testing the precision of the approximate interarrival time distribution of the 
manufacturer presented in equation (3.29), simulation models are developed in the 
case of two, three, and four suppliers as described in Appendix B. The results (see 
Tables B.1-B.3) denote that the approximate distribution fits the interarrival time 
data of the manufacturer in 79 of the 81 cases, giving an error of just 2.47%. Since 
the error of the approximate distribution is reasonable, it is concluded that the 
interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer can be approximated as given in 
equation (3.29). 
3.2 The Model and the Performance Measures 
Recall that in the system taken into consideration, the end customer demands occur 
according to a Poisson process and the service times of the suppliers are i.i.d. and 
exponentially distributed random variables. Under these conditions, each supplier 
can be modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue. Furthermore, the performance 
measures of interest are the average outstanding backorders and the average 
inventory level of each supplier. 
The probability distributions of the outstanding backorders and the inventory level of 
supplier i for 1, ,i n= …  are given by 
{ } ( ){ }
( )
( ) ( )
1
0
1 , 0
lim
1 , 1,2,
i
i
i
i
S
i S
m i
mi it
i S k
S k i i
P k
P B k P B t k
P k
ρ
ρ ρ
+
=
→∞
+
+

= − =
= = = = 

= − =
∑
…
 (3.31) 
and 
{ } ( ){ }
( )
( ) ( )
, 0
lim
1 , 1, 2, , ,
i
i
i
i
i S
m i
m Si it
i S k
S k i i i
P k
P I k P I t k
P k S
ρ
ρ ρ
∞
=
→∞
−
−

= =
= = = = 

= − =
∑
…
 (3.32) 
respectively.  
Hence, the average outstanding backorders at supplier i can be calculated as 
[ ]
1
, 1, , ,
1
iS
i
i
i
E B i nρ
ρ
+
= =
−
…  (3.33) 
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and the average inventory level of supplier i is given by 
[ ] ( )1 , 1, , .
1
iS
i i
i i
i
E I S i n
ρ ρ
ρ
−
= − =
−
…  (3.34) 
On the other hand, under the assumption that arrivals to the manufacturer form a 
renewal process, the manufacturer can be modeled as a / /1GI M  queue with the 
interarrival time distribution given in equation (3.29). Moreover, the performance 
measures of interest are the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system and 
the average outstanding backorders at the manufacturer. 
Shanthikumar and Buzacott (1980) investigate approximations for the mean number 
of jobs in / /1GI G  queuing systems. These approximations require only the squared 
coefficient of variations of the interarrival and service times, denoted by 2AC  and 
2
,SC  
respectively. The authors recommend different approximations for the various values 
of 2AC  and 
2
SC  as given below: 
i. The approximation of Krämer and Langenbach-Belz (1976): 
[ ] ( )( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 2
, , ,
2 1
M A S
M M A S M
M
C C
E N g C C
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
+
+
−
≃  (3.35) 
where MN  denotes the number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system and 
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
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2 1 1
exp , 1
3
, ,
1
exp 1 , 1.
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M A
A
M A S
A S M
A
M A
A S
C
C
C C
g C C
C
C
C C
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
  
− − −
   ≤
  +  
= 
 
−
  − − ≥
 +  
 
ii. The approximation of Marchal (1976): 
[ ] ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1
.
1 2 1
M S A M S
M M
M S M
C C CE N
C
ρ ρρ
ρ ρ
 +  +
 +    + −  
≃  (3.36) 
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iii. The approximation of Page (1972) by adding a slight modification to the original 
formula: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( )2 2 2 2 2 2 11 1 exp .
2 1 3
MM
M M A S S A
M M
E N C C C C
ρρρ
ρ ρ
 
− − 
+ + + −   
−   
≃  (3.37) 
In addition, there are two other approximations for the mean number of jobs in a 
/ /1GI G  queuing system presented by Buzacott and Shanthikumar (1993). These 
approximations are given by 
[ ] ( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
2
1 2
2 2 1
M S M M A M S
M M
M M S M
C C C
E N
C
ρ ρ ρ ρρ
ρ ρ ρ
 +  
− +
 +    
− + −  
≃
 (3.38) 
and 
[ ] ( )( )
( )2 2 2 2 21
.
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M A S A A M
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M
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E N
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
+ −
+ +
−
≃  (3.39) 
For selecting the best-fit approximation for the average number of jobs in the 
manufacturer’s system among the approximations given in equations (3.35)-(3.39), 
simulation models are developed in the case of two, three, and four suppliers as 
described in Appendix C. Afterwards, the errors between the approximations and the 
simulation results are calculated. The results (see Tables C.1-C.3) denote that in the 
case of two, three, and four suppliers, Marchal (1976)’s approximation given in 
equation (3.36) has the minimum average errors of 2.74%, 3.28%, and 4.09%, 
respectively. Since these errors are in acceptable ranges, the approximation of 
Marchal (1976) is selected for the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s 
system. 
As the service times of the manufacturer are exponentially distributed, 2SC  is equal to 
one. By substituting 2AC  calculated from equation (3.30) and 2 1SC =  into equation 
(3.36), the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system is calculated as 
[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )( )
122
2
1 1 2 12
,
1 2 1 1
jS
j M j jM
M M
M j M
E N
ρ ρ ρ ρρρ
ρ ρ ρ
+ + + − − 
 +   + + −  
≃
 (3.40) 
where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
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As stated before, another performance measure of interest is the average outstanding 
backorders at the manufacturer. Since the manufacturer holds no inventory, the 
average outstanding backorders is equal to the average number of jobs in the 
manufacturer’s queue, the derivation of which is given below. 
From equation (3.29), the mean interarrival time of the manufacturer is calculated as 
1 .λ  In addition, since the service times of the manufacturer are exponentially 
distributed, the mean service time is 1 .Mµ  Then, using Little’s formula, it is easy to 
prove that 
[ ] ,
Mq M M
E N E N ρ  = −   (3.41) 
where 
Mq
N  denotes the number of jobs in the manufacturer’s queue. 
Substituting equation (3.40) into equation (3.41) yields that the average number of 
jobs in the manufacturer’s queue, i.e., the average outstanding backorders at the 
manufacturer, can be expressed as  
[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )( )
122
2
1 1 2 12
,
1 2 1 1
j
M
S
j M j jM
q M
M j M
E N E B
ρ ρ ρ ρρ
ρ ρ ρ
+ + + − − 
   =     + + −  
≃  (3.42) 
where MB  is the outstanding backorders at the manufacturer and 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 
To summarize, the supply chain has been modeled as a queuing system in this 
chapter. The next chapter presents the centralized and decentralized models that are 
developed using the performance measures obtained from the queuing model. 
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4. THE CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED MODELS 
In the centralized system, there is a single decision maker who tries to optimize the 
overall supply chain. On the other hand, in the decentralized system, each supplier 
tries to optimize his own entity and the manufacturer does likewise. In this chapter, 
the centralized and decentralized models are developed; and the solutions to these 
models are given. Notice that the centralized system is also considered in this thesis 
since the centralized solution is used as a reference point for the performance of the 
decentralized system.  
4.1 The Centralized Model 
In the centralized model, the objective of the single decision maker is to minimize 
the average total backorder and holding costs per unit time for the overall system. 
The decision variables are the base stock levels of the suppliers. Other cost terms, 
such as the unit production cost or the order processing cost could also be included in 
the objective function. However, since these cost terms do not include the decision 
variables, adding them would not affect the optimal solution. 
Now, let ib  be the backorder cost per unit backordered at supplier i per unit time; Mb  
be the backorder cost per unit backordered at the manufacturer per unit time; and ih  
be the holding cost per unit inventory per unit time for supplier i, where 1, , .i n= …  It 
is assumed that 0ib >  and 0ih >  for all 1, , ,i n= …  and 0.Mb >  
In addition to the notation given above, let 
iS
C  denote the average cost per unit time 
for supplier i, where 1, , ,i n= …  and MC  denote the average cost per unit time for the 
manufacturer. Then, 
iS
C  and MC  can be expressed as 
[ ] [ ], 1, ,
iS i i i i
C b E B h E I i n= + = …
 (4.1) 
and 
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[ ],M M MC b E B=  (4.2) 
respectively. Notice that the average cost of the manufacturer is only equal to his 
average backorder cost since no inventory is held by the manufacturer. 
By substituting equations (3.33) and (3.34) into equation (4.1), 
iS
C  can be written as 
a function of iS  given by 
( ) ( )1 1 , 1, , .
1 1
ii
i
SS
i ii
S i i i i
i i
C S b h S i n
ρ ρρ
ρ ρ
+  
− 
 = + − =   − −   
…  (4.3) 
On the other hand, by substituting equation (3.42) into equation (4.2), MC  can be 
expressed as a function of jS  as given below: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
122
2
1 1 2 12
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C S C S b
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ρ ρ ρ
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 =   + + −  
ɶ≃
 (4.4) 
where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 
Finally, let TC  be the average total backorder and holding costs per unit time for the 
overall system. Then, using equations (4.3) and (4.4), TC  can be written as a function 
of 1, , nS S…  given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
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1
1
1 1
122
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, ,
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1 1
1 1 2 12
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1 2 1 1
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ρ ρ ρ
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+
= =
+
= +
 
− 
 + −   − −   
 + + − − 
 +   + + −  
∑
∑ ∑
…
≃  (4.5) 
where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 
Recall that in the centralized model, the decision maker tries to minimize the average 
total backorder and holding costs per unit time for the overall system. Then, from 
equation (4.5), the centralized system leads to the following nonlinear optimization 
problem: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
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∑
∑ ∑
ɶ ɶ…
…
 (4.6) 
where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 
To find the optimal solution to the centralized model, the condition 
1, ,
arg min i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 is 
not taken into consideration at the beginning. Then, for the nonlinear optimization 
problem presented in equation (4.6), the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are 
given by 
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
2
1
2
ln
1
1 ln2 0,
11 1
j
j
Sj
j j j j
j
j j SM
M j j
jM M
h b h
b u
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρρ ρ
ρρ ρ
+
+
 
+ +   
− 
  
−
  − − =
   ++ −   
 (4.7a) 
( ) 1ln 0, 1, , , ,
1
iSi
i i i i i
i
h b h u i n i jρ ρ
ρ
+ + + − = = ≠ 
− 
…  (4.7b) 
0, 1, , ,iS i n≥ = …   (4.7c) 
0, 1, , ,i iu S i n= = …  (4.7d) 
0, 1, , .iu i n≥ = …  (4.7e) 
Recall that the suppliers considered in this thesis apply base stock policy to manage 
their inventories. Therefore, similar to Cachon (1999) and Gupta and Weerawat 
(2006), it is assumed that the optimal base stock levels of the suppliers are not equal 
to zero.  
According to equation (4.7e), 0ju ≥  since { }1, , .j n∈ …  Then, if ( )0 0,T jC S∂ ∂ <ɶ  
equation (4.7a) does not hold giving that 0jS =  is not optimal. Again using equation 
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(4.7e), if ( )0 0T iC S∂ ∂ <ɶ  for all ,i j≠  equation (4.7b) does not hold resulting in that 
0iS =  is not optimal. Consequently, throughout the thesis it is assumed that 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )2
2
1 lnln 2 0
1 11 1
j jj M
j j j j M j
j jM M
h b h b
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 (4.8) 
and 
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ρ
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+ + < = ≠ 
− 
…  (4.9) 
Lemma 4.1. ( )1, ,T nC S Sɶ …  is a strictly convex function on nℝ  for given j. 
Proof. The Hessian of ( )1, ,T nC S Sɶ …  is given by 
( )
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where 
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 (4.10) 
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iSi
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H b h i n i jρ ρ
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+
 
= + = ≠ 
 
− 
…  (4.11) 
and all other entries are zero. 
Using the assumption given in equation (4.8), it can be shown that 
( ) ( )( )
2
2
12ln 0
1 11 1
j j jM
j j M
j jM M
b h
b
ρρρ ρ
ρ ρρ ρ
   + −
  − <    − ++ −    
 (4.12) 
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because 0.jh >  Notice that the assumptions made for all 1, ,i n= …  are also valid for 
j since { }1, , .j n∈ …  
Then, as 0 1,jρ< <  equation (4.12) leads to 
( )( )
2
2
12 0,
1 11 1
j j jM
M
j jM M
b h
b
ρρ
ρ ρρ ρ
  + −
 − >   
− ++ −   
 (4.13) 
giving that 0jjH >  for jS ∈ℝ  (see equation (4.10)). 
It is also obvious that since 0,ib >  0,ih >  and 0 1iρ< <  for all 1, , ,i n= …  0iiH >  
for iS ∈ℝ  for all i j≠  (see equation (4.11)). 
Consequently, all the kth order leading principal minors of the Hessian are positive. 
Therefore, the Hessian is positive definite for all iS ∈ℝ  for 1, , ,i n= …  which is a 
sufficient condition for ( )1, ,T nC S Sɶ …  to be a strictly convex function on .nℝ    □ 
Theorem 4.1. The global optimal solution to the centralized model presented in 
equation (4.6) is given by 
( )( ) ( )
2
2
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12 ln
1 11 1
, ,
ln
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j j jM
M j j
j jM M
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j
h
b h
b
S j j
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 
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= =  (4.14) 
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= = ≠…  (4.15) 
where ( )1arg min , , , ,T j n
j J
j C S S S∗
∈
=
ɶ … …  and j J∈  iff 
1, ,
minj ii nS S== …  for 1, , .j n= …  
Proof. To calculate the optimal solution to the centralized model, the model has to be 
solved n times, each time setting j equal to 1, , ,n…  respectively. Recall that the 
condition 
1, ,
arg min i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 is ignored while solving the model each time. 
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For each 1, , ,j n= …  when ju  is set to zero in KKT condition (4.7a), jS  is calculated 
as given in equation (4.14). 
In addition, from the assumption presented in equation (4.8), it is easy to prove that 
( )( ) ( )
2
2
0 1.
12 ln
1 11 1
j
j j jM
M j j
j jM M
h
b h
b
ρρ ρ ρρ ρρ ρ
−
< <
   + −
  −     − ++ −    
 (4.16) 
Then, using equation (4.16) and 0 1,jρ< <  equation (4.14) results in 0,jS >  
satisfying the KKT conditions. 
Likewise, for each 1, , ,j n= …  when iu  is set to zero in KKT condition (4.7b) for all 
,i j≠  iS  is found as given in equation (4.15). 
Furthermore, using the assumption presented in equation (4.9), it can be shown that 
( )
( )( )
1
0 1, 1, , , .
ln
i i
i i i i
h
i n i j
b h
ρ
ρ ρ
− −
< < = ≠
+
…  (4.17) 
Then, from equation (4.17), and since 0 1iρ< <  for all 1, , ,i n= …  equation (4.15) 
gives 0iS >  for all ,i j≠  satisfying the KKT conditions. 
As the centralized model presented in equation (4.6) is a minimization problem 
having linear constraints and an objective function that is strictly convex on nℝ  for 
given j (see Lemma 4.1), and as the solution for each 1, ,j n= …  satisfies the KKT 
conditions, each solution is the unique global optimal solution to the model for the j 
given. However, since the condition 
1, ,
arg min i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 is ignored while solving the 
model each time, some of the solutions may not be feasible for the centralized model. 
Nevertheless, it is easy to prove that at least one of the solutions is feasible. Briefly, 
if all the base stock levels were calculated using equation (4.15), it is obvious that 
one of them would be the minimum; for instance, say 1.S  It is also easy to see that 
the base stock level calculated from equation (4.14) is always smaller than the one 
calculated from equation (4.15) for the same supplier. Therefore, when j is set to one, 
1S  calculated from equation (4.14) will also be the minimum, proving that at least 
one of the solutions is feasible.  
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After finding separate solutions for each 1, , ,j n= …  to find the optimal solution to 
the centralized model, the condition 
1, ,
arg min i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 has to be taken into account. 
Consequently, among the solutions in which 
1, ,
min ,j ii nS S== …  the one that minimizes the 
objective function given in equation (4.6) is the global optimal solution to the 
centralized model, concluding the proof.   □ 
Remark 4.1. The optimal solution given in equations (4.14) and (4.15) ignores the 
integrality of the base stock levels of the suppliers. However, the optimal integer 
solution to the centralized model can also be found as follows. First, the model has to 
be solved n times, each time setting j equal to 1, , ,n…  respectively. Then each time, 
jS  is rounded to jS    and ;jS    iS  is rounded to iS    and iS    for all ;i j≠  and 
the objective function value is calculated for all feasible combinations, where 
1, ,
int min int .j ii nS S== …  Here, x    stands for the largest integer less than or equal to x; 
x    stands for the smallest integer greater than or equal to x; and int x  denotes the 
rounded integer value of x. Notice that if int intj iS S=  for some ,i j≠  then jρ  must 
be greater than or equal to iρ  for a combination to be feasible. Among all feasible 
combinations, the one that minimizes the objective function presented in equation 
(4.6) gives the optimal integer solution to the centralized model. 
4.2 The Decentralized Model 
In the decentralized model, the objective of each member of the supply chain is to 
minimize the average cost per unit time for his own system. Therefore, supplier i for 
1, ,i n= …  tries to minimize his average backorder and holding costs per unit time, 
which is presented in equation (4.3). Since the decision variables are the base stock 
levels of the suppliers, this leads to the following decentralized model for supplier i, 
where 1, , :i n= …  
( ) ( )
{ }
1 1
minimize
1 1
subject to 0, 1, , .
ii
i
SS
i ii
S i i i i
i i
i
C S b h S
S i n
ρ ρρ
ρ ρ
+  
− 
 = + −   − −   
≥ ∈ …
 (4.18) 
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From the manufacturer’s point of view, as the manufacturer holds no inventory, he 
only wants to minimize his average backorder cost per unit time, which is given in 
equation (4.4). However, since the decision variables are the base stock levels of the 
suppliers, the manufacturer is not included in the decentralized model.  
From equation (4.4), notice that the average backorder cost per unit time for the 
manufacturer depends on ,jS  where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 Therefore, even though the 
manufacturer is not included in the decentralized model, he is affected by supplier j’s 
decision.  
Again using equation (4.4), it can be seen that ( )M jC Sɶ  is minimized for 0,jS =  
which can be interpreted as follows: As jS  approaches zero, the arrival of 
component j to the manufacturer takes longer time on average. Hence, the average 
number of jobs in the manufacturer’s queue, i.e., the average number of outstanding 
backorders arisen from the manufacturer’s own system, decreases, reducing the 
average backorder cost per unit time for the manufacturer.  
Theorem 4.2. The unique global optimal solution to the decentralized model for 
supplier i presented in equation (4.18) is given by 
( )
( )( ) { }
1
ln
ln
, 1, , .
ln
i i
i i i i
i
i
h
b h
S i n
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ο
 
− −
 
+ 
= ∈ …
 (4.19) 
Proof. For the nonlinear optimization problem given in equation (4.18), the KKT 
conditions can be written as 
( ) { }1ln 0, 1, , ,
1
iSi
i i i i i
i
h b h u i nρ ρ
ρ
+ + + − = ∈ 
− 
…  (4.20a) 
{ }0, 1, , ,iS i n≥ ∈ …  (4.20b) 
{ }0, 1, , ,i iu S i n= ∈ …  (4.20c) 
{ }0, 1, , .iu i n≥ ∈ …  (4.20d) 
When iu  is set to zero in KKT condition (4.20a) for { }1, , ,i n∈ …  iS  is found as 
given in equation (4.19). 
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On the other hand, recall the assumption that the optimal base stock levels of the 
suppliers are not equal to zero. Therefore, the assumption given in equation (4.9) and 
accordingly equation (4.17) can be extended to all 1, ,i n= …  in the decentralized 
case. Then, using equation (4.17) and 0 1iρ< <  for all 1, , ,i n= …  equation (4.19) 
gives 0iS >  for { }1, , ,i n∈ …  satisfying the KKT conditions. 
Finally, since 0,ib >  0,ih >  and 0 1iρ< <  for all 1, , ,i n= …   
( ) ( ) ( )
22
1
2
ln
0
1
i iS i Si
i i i
i i
C S
b h
S
ρ ρ
ρ
+
 ∂
= + > 
 ∂ − 
  
for ,iS ∈ℝ  indicating that ( )iS iC S  given in equation (4.18) is a strictly convex 
function on .ℝ   
As a result, since the decentralized model for supplier i presented in equation (4.18) 
is a minimization problem having a linear constraint and an objective function that is 
strictly convex on ,ℝ  and since the solution iS
ο
 given in equation (4.19) satisfies the 
KKT conditions, it is also the unique global optimal solution to the decentralized 
model for supplier i, where 1, , ,i n= …  concluding the proof.   □ 
Remark 4.2. The optimal solution iS
ο
 given in equation (4.19) ignores the integrality 
of the base stock level of supplier i, where 1, , .i n= …  However, the optimal integer 
solution to the decentralized model can easily be found, such that the optimal integer 
value of iS  is the one among iS
ο    and ,iS
ο    which minimizes the objective 
function given in equation (4.18). 
As a summary, the centralized and decentralized models are developed and the 
optimal solutions to these models are derived in this chapter. The next chapter 
continues with the comparison of these optimal solutions and accordingly the 
development of the transfer payment contracts for the coordination of the 
decentralized system. 
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5. COORDINATION OF THE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM 
A supply chain is coordinated if each member acts rationally according to the supply 
chain optimal solution, i.e., the decentralized solution is equal to the centralized 
solution. Notice that the optimal solution to the centralized model given in equation 
(4.6) is indeed the approximate centralized solution to the system, since the model 
has an approximate objective function. However, from now on, it will be referred to 
as the “centralized solution” for simplicity. Similarly, the “decentralized solution” 
refers to the optimal solution to the decentralized model given in equation (4.18). 
Comparing the centralized solution given in equations (4.14) and (4.15) with the 
decentralized solution given in equation (4.19)2, it is found that i iS S∗ ο=  for all i j≠  
and ,j jS S
∗ ο≠  where j j∗=  as defined in Theorem 4.1. Therefore, a coordination 
mechanism should be investigated between supplier j and the manufacturer.  
Proposition 5.1. The centralized solution for supplier j given in equation (4.14) is 
smaller than the decentralized solution given in equation (4.19), i.e., .j jS S∗ ο<  
Proof. Using the assumption given in equation (4.8) and 0,jb >  0,jh >  0 1,jρ< <  
0,Mb >  and 0 1,Mρ< <  it is easy to show that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
.
12 lnln 11 11 1
j j
j jj j jM j jM j j
jj jM M
h h
b hb h
b
ρρ ρ ρρ ρ ρρ ρρ ρ
− −
>
   +  + −
    −      −  − ++ −     
 (5.1) 
By taking the natural logarithm of both sides and dividing by ln ,jρ  the proof of 
j jS S
∗ ο<  is completed.   □ 
As explained in the previous chapter, the average backorder cost per unit time for the 
manufacturer decreases as jS  approaches zero. Therefore, one can already anticipate 
                                               
2
 Notice that equation (4.19) is valid for all suppliers, including supplier j. 
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the fact ,j jS S
∗ ο<  which means that a coordinating contract has to decrease the base 
stock level of supplier j. Decreasing jS  yields lower average holding cost, whereas 
higher average backorder cost per unit time for this supplier. Hence, the 
manufacturer has to prepare a contract to induce supplier j to choose a smaller base 
stock level than his decentralized solution. Remark that since the average cost per 
unit time for each supplier depends only on his base stock level (see equation (4.3)), 
a change in the average cost function per unit time for supplier j does not affect the 
optimal strategies of the other suppliers. Therefore, the fact i iS S
∗ ο
=  for all i j≠  
remains the same after the contract. 
In the following sections of this chapter, three different transfer payment contracts 
are studied to coordinate the supply chain. These are the backorder cost subsidy 
contract, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost 
sharing contract. These contracts are examined in this thesis since they are expected 
to encourage supplier j to select a smaller base stock level than his decentralized 
solution, which is necessary for the coordination process. 
Besides its ability to coordinate the supply chain, a contract should also be Pareto 
improving, i.e., at least one of the supply chain members should be strictly better off 
without making any other member worse off after the transfer payment. Therefore, 
each contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is 
Pareto improving or not. 
In this chapter, the average cost functions per unit time for the manufacturer (and 
also for supplier j in the cost sharing contract) after the transfer payments depend on 
( )M jC Sɶ  given in equation (4.4), yielding that these functions are approximate. In 
addition, recall that the centralized model given in equation (4.6) is also developed 
using ( ).M jC Sɶ  Therefore, the contracts are based on the average cost functions per 
unit time for supplier j and the approximate average cost functions per unit time for 
the manufacturer (and also for supplier j in the cost sharing contract). The contracts 
are also evaluated whether they are Pareto improving or not according to these cost 
functions. 
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5.1 The Backorder Cost Subsidy Contract 
As stated before, a coordinating contract has to induce supplier j to choose a smaller 
base stock level than his decentralized solution. Hence, a backorder cost subsidy 
contract, in which the manufacturer covers some part of supplier j’s backorder costs, 
seems to be able to coordinate the supply chain.  
In the backorder cost subsidy contract, the manufacturer pays supplier j B jbα  per unit 
backordered at supplier j per unit time, where 0 1.Bα< <  Then, after the transfer 
payment, the average cost function per unit time for supplier j and the approximate 
average cost function per unit time for the manufacturer that are given in equations 
(4.3)3 and (4.4) modify to  
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 1
jj
j
SS
j jjB
S j B j j j
j j
C S b h S
ρ ρρ
α
ρ ρ
+  
− 
 
= − + − 
   
− −   
 (5.2) 
and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1 122
2
1 1 2 12
,
1 12 1 1
j jS S
j M j j jB M
M j M B j
M jj M
C S b b
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ
α
ρ ρρ ρ
+ +   + + − − 
 = +      + −+ −    
ɶ
 (5.3) 
respectively. 
Theorem 5.1. The backorder cost subsidy contract coordinates the supply chain for 
( )( )
( )
( )
2
2
2
12
.
11 1
jM
B M
j jM M
b
b
ρρ
α
ρρ ρ
  
−
  =
  ++ −  
 (5.4) 
Proof. Let us start the proof by showing that Bα  given in equation (5.4) is feasible, 
i.e., 0 1.Bα< <  Since 0,jb >  0 1,jρ< <  0,Mb >  and 0 1,Mρ< <  it is obvious that 
0.Bα >  The proof of 1Bα <  is not that simple, but a step by step procedure brings 
forth the proof. First, it is not hard to show that  
( )
1
ln
ln
0.
ln
j
j j
j
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
 
−
 
 
  <  (5.5) 
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 Notice that equation (4.3) is valid for all suppliers, including supplier j. 
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Since 0jS
∗ >  (see the proof of Theorem 4.1), equation (5.5) can be rewritten as 
( )
1
ln
ln
.
ln
j
j j
j
j
S
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
∗
 
−
 
 
  <  (5.6) 
Then, substituting equation (4.14) into equation (5.6) leads to  
( )( )
2
2
1 .
12
1 11 1
j
j
j j jM
M
j jM M
h
b h
b
ρ
ρρ
ρ ρρ ρ
< −
  + −
 −    
− ++ −   
 (5.7) 
Finally, using equation (4.13), equation (5.7) yields 1.Bα <  
Now, let us prove that the backorder cost subsidy contract coordinates the supply 
chain for Bα  given in equation (5.4). As 0,jb >  0,jh >  0 1,jρ< <  and 0 1,Bα< <  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
22
1
2
ln
1 0
1
j j
B
S j j S
B j j j
j j
C S
b h
S
ρ
α ρ
ρ
+
 ∂
 = − + >
 ∂ −
 
 
for ,jS ∈ℝ  indicating that ( )jBS jC S  given in equation (5.2) is a strictly convex 
function on .ℝ  Then, for Bα  given in equation (5.4), solving the first order condition 
( )( ) 1ln1 01 jSjj B j j jjh b h
ρ
α ρ
ρ
+ 
+ − + =  
− 
 
results in jS
∗
 as presented in equation (4.14).  
Consequently, since the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment 
is a minimization problem with a strictly convex objective function ( )jBS jC S  over a 
convex set 0,jS ≥  jS
∗
 given in equation (4.14) is the unique global optimal solution 
to the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment. As supplier j’s 
decentralized solution is equal to ,jS
∗
 it is proved that the backorder cost subsidy 
contract coordinates the supply chain for Bα  given in equation (5.4).   □ 
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Theorem 5.2. The backorder cost subsidy contract is not Pareto improving.  
Proof. Using equations (4.3), (5.2), and (5.4), the average costs per unit time for 
supplier j before and after the transfer payment are given by 
( ) ( )1 11 1
jj
j
SS j jj
S j j j j
j j
C S b h S
ρ ρρ
ρ ρ
ο
ο +
ο ο
 
− 
  = + −  − −    
 (5.8) 
and 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
2 12
2
121
111 1
1
,
1
j
j
j
S
j jB M
S j M j
jj jM M
S
j j
j j
j
C S b b
b
h S
ρ ρρ
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     = −
     −++ −     
 
−
 + − 
− 
 
 (5.9) 
respectively.  
From equations (5.8) and (5.9), the difference 
j
B
SD  between the average backorder 
costs per unit time for supplier j before and after the transfer payment is given by  
( )( )
( )
( )
21 12
2
121 .
1 111 1
j j
j
S S
jj jB M
S j M j
j jj jM M
D b b b
b
ρρ ρρ
ρ ρρρ ρ
ο ∗+ +      
−      = − −
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 (5.10) 
Substituting equations (4.14) and (4.19) into equation (5.10) yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
2
2 2
2
21 1
1 11
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j j M j
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b h
b b h b
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= −
+   
  + + − −
  + −  
 (5.11) 
Then, 1Bα <  gives that the numerator of the second term in equation (5.11) is 
positive and equation (4.13) yields that its denominator is also positive. Afterwards, 
it is easily proved that 0,
j
B
SD >  i.e., the average backorder cost per unit time for 
supplier j decreases after the transfer payment. 
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On the other hand, it is easy to prove that the average holding cost function per unit 
time for supplier j, which is the second term in equation (4.3), is strictly convex on 
ℝ  and takes its minimum value at  
( )
1
ln
ln
.
ln
j
j j
j
j
S
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
 
−
 
 
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=   
Therefore, for  
( )
1
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ln
,
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j
j j
j
j
S
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
 
−
 
 
 >   
the function is increasing in .jS   
From Proposition 5.1 and equation (5.6), it is known that 
( )
1
ln
ln
,
ln
j
j j
j j
j
S S
ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
ο ∗
 
−
 
 
 > >   
which proves the decrease of the average holding cost per unit time for supplier j 
after the transfer payment. 
Consequently, it is shown that the average cost per unit time for supplier j decreases 
after the contract, i.e., ( ) ( ).j jBS j S jC S C S∗ ο<  
Now, let us examine the manufacturer. Using equations (4.4), (5.3), and (5.4), the 
approximate average costs per unit time for the manufacturer before and after the 
transfer payment are given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
122
2
1 1 2 12
1 2 1 1
jS
j M j jM
M j M
M j M
C S b
ρ ρ ρ ρρ
ρ ρ ρ
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ο
 + + − −  =  
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ɶ
 (5.12) 
and 
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 (5.13) 
respectively.  
From equations (5.12) and (5.13), since 0jS ο >  (see the proof of Theorem 4.2), 
0 1,jρ< <  0,Mb >  and 0 1,Mρ< <  it is easily proved that ( ) ( ).BM j M jC S C S∗ ο>ɶ ɶ  
As a result, the average cost per unit time for supplier j decreases after the transfer 
payment, whereas the approximate average cost per unit time for the manufacturer 
increases. Therefore, the backorder cost subsidy contract is not Pareto improving.   □ 
5.2 The Transfer Payment Contract Based on Pareto Improvement 
In the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, the manufacturer 
pays supplier j an amount that makes the manufacturer as well off after the transfer 
payment as before. The transfer payment satisfying this condition is given by 
( ) ( )( )
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( )( )
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1 ln1 1
j j jSjP M
j M j
j j j jM M
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T S b
b h
ρρρ ρ
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 (5.14) 
Then, after the transfer payment, the average cost function per unit time for supplier j 
and the approximate average cost function per unit time for the manufacturer that are 
given in equations (4.3) and (4.4) become 
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1
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 (5.15) 
and 
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 (5.16) 
respectively, where ( )P jT S  is as given in equation (5.14). 
Theorem 5.3. The transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement 
coordinates the supply chain. 
Proof. Using equation (4.13) and 0 1,jρ< <  
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for ,jS ∈ℝ  pointing out that ( )jPS jC S  given in equation (5.15) is a strictly convex 
function on .ℝ  Then, the solution to the first order condition 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )21 1
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1 lnln 2 0
1 11 1
j jj jS Sj M
j j j j M j
j jM M
h b h b
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− ++ −    
  
is jS
∗
 as given in equation (4.14).  
Notice that the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment is a 
minimization problem having a strictly convex objective function ( )jPS jC S  over a 
convex set 0.jS ≥  Hence, jS
∗
 given in equation (4.14) is the unique global optimal 
solution to the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment. Since 
supplier j’s decentralized solution is equal to ,jS∗  it is proved that the transfer 
payment contract based on Pareto improvement coordinates the supply chain.   □ 
Theorem 5.4. The transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement is Pareto 
improving.  
Proof. The average cost per unit time for supplier j before the transfer payment is as 
given in equation (5.8). On the other hand, using equation (5.15), the average cost 
per unit time for supplier j after the transfer payment is given by 
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 (5.17) 
By substituting equation (4.19) into equation (5.8), and equation (4.14) into equation 
(5.17), the difference between the average costs per unit time for supplier j before 
and after the transfer payment can be expressed as 
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 (5.18) 
From equation (4.13), and since 0,jb >  0,jh >  0 1,jρ< <  0,Mb >  and 0 1,Mρ< <  
it can be shown that  
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 (5.19) 
For simplicity, let 
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z b
b h
ρρ
ρρ ρ
  
−
  =
  + ++ −  
 (5.20) 
Then, equation (5.18) can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( )ln 1 .j jPS j S jC S C S z zο ∗− = − − −  (5.21) 
Afterwards, it can be easily proved that the function given in equation (5.21) is 
strictly convex on ℝ  and takes its minimum value zero at 0.z =  Then, since 
0 1z< <  (see equations (5.19) and (5.20)), the function given in equation (5.21) is 
always positive, i.e., ( ) ( ).j jPS j S jC S C S∗ ο<  
Now, recall that the transfer payment ( )P jT S  given in equation (5.14) satisfies that 
the manufacturer is as well off after the transfer payment as before. To prove this 
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statement, let us examine the manufacturer. The approximate average cost per unit 
time for the manufacturer before the transfer payment is as given in equation (5.12). 
On the other hand, using equation (5.16), the approximate average cost per unit time 
for the manufacturer after the transfer payment is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
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j j j jM M
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b h
ρ ρ ρ ρρ
ρ ρ ρ
ρρρ ρ
ρ ρρ ρ
∗
∗
+
∗
+
 + + − −  =  
 + + −  
   
− 
−
   + +     + ++ −    
ɶ
 (5.22) 
Notice that the terms including 1jSjρ
∗ +
 cancel each other in equation (5.22). Then, 
substituting equation (4.19) into equation (5.12) proves that ( ) ( ).PM j M jC S C S∗ ο=ɶ ɶ  
Consequently, the average cost per unit time for supplier j decreases after the transfer 
payment, and the approximate average cost per unit time for the manufacturer 
remains the same. Therefore, the contract is Pareto improving.   □ 
5.3 The Cost Sharing Contract 
In the cost sharing contract, similar to the study of Caldentey and Wein (2003), the 
manufacturer pays supplier j an amount such that supplier j covers Cα  of their 
approximate average total costs per unit time after the transfer payment, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ,jCS j C jC S C Sα=ɶ ɶ  (5.23) 
and the manufacturer covers ( )1 Cα−  of their approximate average total costs per 
unit time given by 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,CM j C jC S C Sα= −ɶ ɶ  (5.24) 
where 0 1Cα< <  and 
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 (5.25) 
Then, the transfer payment satisfying equations (5.23) and (5.24) is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,jC j C S j C M jT S C S C Sα α= − − ɶ  
where ( )jS jC S  and ( )M jC Sɶ  are as given in equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. 
Theorem 5.5. The cost sharing contract coordinates the supply chain. 
Proof. Using equation (4.13), 0 1,jρ< <  and 0,Cα >  
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for ,jS ∈ℝ  indicating that ( )jCS jC Sɶ  given in equation (5.23) is a strictly convex 
function on .ℝ  Then, solving the first order condition 
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yields jS
∗
 as given in equation (4.14).  
As a result, since the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment is a 
minimization problem having a strictly convex objective function ( )jCS jC Sɶ  over a 
convex set 0,jS ≥  jS
∗
 given in equation (4.14) is the unique global optimal solution 
to the decentralized model for supplier j after the transfer payment. As supplier j’s 
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decentralized solution is equal to ,jS
∗
 it is proved that the cost sharing contract 
coordinates the supply chain.   □ 
Theorem 5.6. The cost sharing contract is Pareto improving for any Cα  satisfying 
( )
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( )
( ) ( )1 , 0,1 ,
jS jM j
C
j j
C SC S
C S C S
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οο
∗ ∗
 
 ∈ − ∩
  
ɶ
ɶ ɶ
 (5.26) 
where ( )jS jC S ο  is as given in equation (5.8), ( )M jC S οɶ  is as given in equation (5.12), 
and from equation (5.25),  
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 (5.27) 
Furthermore, there is always an Cα  satisfying equation (5.26). 
Proof. The average cost per unit time for supplier j before the transfer payment is 
( )jS jC S ο  as given in equation (5.8). On the other hand, using equation (5.23), the 
approximate average cost per unit time for supplier j after the transfer payment can 
be expressed as 
( ) ( ) ,jCS j C jC S C Sα∗ ∗=ɶ ɶ  (5.28) 
where ( )jC S ∗ɶ  is as given in equation (5.27). 
Then, supplier j is at least as well off after the transfer payment as before if and only 
if ( ) ( ) ,j jCS j S jC S C Sο ∗≥ ɶ  leading to 
( )
( )
jS j
C
j
C S
C S
α
ο
∗
≤
ɶ
 (5.29) 
from equation (5.28). 
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In the same manner, the approximate average cost per unit time for the manufacturer 
before the transfer payment is ( )M jC S οɶ  as given in equation (5.12); and from 
equation (5.24), the approximate average cost per unit time for the manufacturer after 
the transfer payment is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,CM j C jC S C Sα∗ ∗= −ɶ ɶ  (5.30) 
where ( )jC S ∗ɶ  is as presented in equation (5.27). 
Then, the manufacturer is at least as well off after the transfer payment as before if 
and only if ( ) ( ) ,CM j M jC S C Sο ∗≥ɶ ɶ  which gives 
( )
( )1
M j
C
j
C S
C S
α
ο
∗
≥ −
ɶ
ɶ
 (5.31) 
from equation (5.30). 
Consequently, as presented in equation (5.26), if Cα  satisfies both conditions given 
in equations (5.29) and (5.31), and also if 0 1,Cα< <  then the cost sharing contract is 
Pareto improving. Thus, the proof of the first part of the theorem is completed. 
On the other hand, to prove that there is always an Cα  satisfying equation (5.26), 
notice that the following three conditions should be fulfilled: 
( )
( )
( )
( )1 ,
jS jM j
j j
C SC S
C S C S
οο
∗ ∗
− <
ɶ
ɶ ɶ
 (5.32) 
( )
( )1 1,
M j
j
C S
C S
ο
∗
− <
ɶ
ɶ
 (5.33) 
and 
( )
( ) 0.
jS j
j
C S
C S
ο
∗
>
ɶ
 (5.34) 
Since jS
∗
 given in equation (4.14) is the optimal solution when the approximate 
average total costs per unit time for the overall system is tried to be minimized, then
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it is obvious that ( ) ( ) ,j jC S C S∗ ο<ɶ ɶ  resulting in that the condition given in equation 
(5.32) is met. 
To prove equation (5.33), let us first verify that ( ) 0M jC S ο >ɶ  and ( ) 0.jC S∗ >ɶ  
Notice that equation (5.12) is equivalent to 
( ) 2 12 121 ,1 1 1 jSjMM j M jM M jC S b
ρρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
ο +ο
  
−   
= −       
− + +     
ɶ
 (5.35) 
and since 0jS
ο >  (see the proof of Theorem 4.2), 0 1,jρ< <  and 0 1,Mρ< <  it is 
easy to confirm that 
1
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ο +   − − 
< <       + + +    
 (5.36) 
Then, using equations (5.35) and (5.36), 0,Mb >  and 0 1,Mρ< <  it is proved that 
( ) 0.M jC S ο >ɶ  (5.37) 
Now, let us show that ( ) 0,jC S ∗ >ɶ  where ( )jC S∗ɶ  is as defined in equation (5.27).  
First, since 0jb >  and 0 1,jρ< <  it is obvious that 
1
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1
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  >
 −
 
 (5.38) 
Second, to prove  
( )1
0,
1
jS
j j
j
j
S
ρ ρ
ρ
∗
∗
−
− >
−
  
both sides are multiplied by ( )1 jρ−  giving 
( ) ( )1 1 0.jSj j j jS ρ ρ ρ ∗∗ − − − >  (5.39) 
Afterwards, it can be easily proved that the function given in equation (5.39) is 
decreasing in jρ  and takes its minimum value zero at 1.jρ =  Then, since 0 1,jρ< <  
the function given in equation (5.39) is always positive, leading to  
 61
( )1
0.
1
jS
j j
j
j
S
ρ ρ
ρ
∗
∗
−
− >
−
 (5.40) 
Thereupon, using equation (5.40) and 0,jh >  it is proved that 
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Finally, equations (5.38) and (5.41) yield that 
( ) 0.jS jC S∗ >  (5.42) 
On the other hand, similar to ( ) 0M jC S ο >ɶ  given in equation (5.37), 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
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 (5.43) 
can also be proved easily.  
Then, from equations (5.42) and (5.43), it is verified that  
( ) 0.jC S∗ >ɶ  (5.44) 
Consequently, using equations (5.37) and (5.44), it is proved that the condition given 
in equation (5.33) is satisfied. 
Finally, to prove equation (5.34), let us first verify that ( ) 0.jS jC S ο >  
Similar to ( ) 0jS jC S ∗ >  given in equation (5.42), 
( ) 0jS jC S ο >  (5.45) 
can also be shown easily.  
Then, from equations (5.44) and (5.45), it is proved that the condition given in 
equation (5.34) is satisfied. 
As a result, since all the conditions given in equations (5.32)-(5.34) are met, there is 
always an Cα  satisfying equation (5.26), completing the proof.   □ 
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5.4 Comparison of the Contracts 
Three different transfer payment contracts are studied in this thesis to coordinate the 
decentralized system. These are the backorder cost subsidy contract, the transfer 
payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost sharing contract. All 
the contracts have the ability to coordinate the supply chain as given in Theorem 5.1, 
Theorem 5.3, and Theorem 5.5. 
However, besides its ability to coordinate the supply chain, a contract should also be 
Pareto improving. Otherwise, at least one of the members of the supply chain will 
not be desirous to participate in the contract. When the contracts are evaluated from 
this perspective, the backorder cost subsidy contract fails as presented in Theorem 
5.2. Conversely, the other two contracts are Pareto improving as given in Theorem 
5.4 and Theorem 5.6. Among the other two contracts, in the transfer payment 
contract based on Pareto improvement, only the supplier is better off after the 
transfer payment, but the manufacturer is just as well off after the contract as before. 
On the other hand, in the cost sharing contract, both members can be better off after 
the transfer payment for an appropriately selected contract parameter. The 
comparison of the contracts is summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Comparison of the contracts. 
Contract Coordination 
ability 
Pareto 
improvement 
Supplier’s cost 
after the contract 
Manufacturer’s cost 
after the contract 
Backorder cost subsidy contract Yes No Decreases Increases 
Transfer payment contract 
based on Pareto improvement Yes Yes Decreases Remains same 
Cost sharing contract Yes Yes Decreases Decreases 
Consequently, while all three contracts have the ability to coordinate the supply 
chain, the cost sharing contract has a dominance over the other contracts when Pareto 
improvement is taken into account. Therefore, both members of the supply chain will 
be more advantageous under this contract. As a result, the cost sharing contract is 
suggested for the coordination of the decentralized supply chain. 
Recall that in this thesis, the centralized and decentralized models are developed 
based on the average backorder and holding costs per unit time. Therefore, according 
to this cost metric, the centralized system performs better than the decentralized 
system. Then, three different transfer payment contracts are studied in this chapter 
for the coordination of the supply chain, so that the average total costs per unit time 
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for the decentralized system become equal to that of the centralized system after the 
transfer payment. However, when different performance metrics are taken into 
account, the decentralized system may have a better performance than the centralized 
system. Therefore, the next chapter presents a numerical study to compare these 
systems also based on other performance metrics.  
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6. NUMERICAL STUDY 
In this chapter, the centralized and decentralized systems are compared based on 
SCOR Model performance metrics. The SCOR Model, i.e., The Supply-Chain 
Operations Reference-model, is developed by the Supply-Chain Council; and it 
provides a framework and standardized terminology to help organizations integrating 
a number of management tools. To our knowledge, it is the most widely accepted 
supply chain reference model in use (Cohen and Roussel, 2005). 
SCOR Model defines five key performance attributes, which are reliability, 
responsiveness, flexibility, cost, and assets. Among these attributes, reliability, 
responsiveness, and flexibility directly affect the customer, i.e., they are customer-
facing, whereas cost and assets have a direct impact on the company, i.e., internal-
facing (Presutti and Mawhinney, 2007).  
In the light of these attributes, SCOR Model associates several performance metrics 
with each attribute. The metrics are defined in three levels such that level one metrics 
are designed to provide a view of the overall supply chain effectiveness. These 
metrics are then decomposed into a group of more detailed level two and level three 
metrics (Cohen and Roussel, 2005). 
To be able to compare the centralized and decentralized systems unbiasedly, the 
performance metrics are chosen such that one metric is associated with each SCOR 
Model performance attribute as given in Table 6.1. While selecting the performance 
metrics, their calculability using the models presented in this thesis is taken into 
account. The complete list of SCOR Model performance metrics can be found in 
Cohen and Roussel (2005). 
Table 6.1: The performance metrics and corresponding performance attributes. 
Performance metrics 
Performance attributes 
Customer-facing Internal-facing 
Reliability Responsiveness Flexibility Cost Assets 
Total number of outstanding backorders X     
Order fulfillment lead time  X    
Supply chain response time   X   
Total backorder and holding costs    X  
Inventory days of supply     X 
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6.1 Design of Experiment 
To compare the performance of the centralized and decentralized supply chains, 
three different experiments are designed for a system with four independent suppliers 
and a manufacturer. The reason of performing different experiments is to consider 
several cases in which the traffic intensities of the supply chain members can be 
classified as low, medium, and high. In all experiments, 1,λ =  { }25,50,100 ,ib ∈  
{ }1,10,20 ,ih ∈  and { }400,600,800Mb ∈  for 1, , 4.i = …  The experiments differ in the 
values that iρ  and Mρ  can take on: { }0.10,0.40,0.55iρ ∈  and { }0.28,0.30Mρ ∈  in 
the first experiment; { }0.35,0.50,0.67iρ ∈  and { }0.38,0.40Mρ ∈  in the second 
experiment; and lastly, { }0.45,0.60,0.90iρ ∈  and { }0.48,0.50Mρ ∈  in the third 
experiment, where 1, , 4.i = …  Then, for each experiment, Taguchi designs4 are 
created using Minitab 15, each with 54 runs. The final data set satisfying the 
assumptions given in equations (4.8) and (4.9) is given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: The final data set of the experiments. 
No. 1ρ
 
2ρ
 
3ρ
 
4ρ
 
Mρ
 
1b
 
2b
 
3b
 
4b
 
Mb
 
1h
 
2h
 
3h
 
4h
 
1 0.10 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.28 100 100 100 25 400 1 1 1 1 
2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.28 50 25 25 100 800 10 10 1 1 
3 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.28 50 25 25 50 600 1 1 20 20 
4 0.40 0.10 0.55 0.10 0.28 50 100 50 100 600 20 1 10 1 
5 0.40 0.40 0.55 0.10 0.30 100 50 25 100 400 10 1 20 10 
6 0.35 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.38 100 100 100 25 400 1 1 1 1 
7 0.35 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.38 100 100 100 50 600 10 10 10 10 
8 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.38 50 25 25 100 800 10 10 1 1 
9 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.38 50 25 25 50 600 1 1 20 20 
10 0.50 0.35 0.67 0.35 0.38 50 100 50 100 600 20 1 10 1 
11 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.35 0.40 100 25 50 100 600 1 20 1 10 
12 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.35 0.40 100 50 25 100 400 10 1 20 10 
13 0.45 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.48 100 100 100 25 400 1 1 1 1 
14 0.45 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.48 100 100 100 50 600 10 10 10 10 
15 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.60 0.48 50 25 25 100 800 10 10 1 1 
16 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.60 0.48 50 25 25 50 600 1 1 20 20 
17 0.60 0.45 0.90 0.45 0.48 50 100 50 100 600 20 1 10 1 
18 0.60 0.60 0.90 0.45 0.50 100 50 25 100 400 10 1 20 10 
 
 
                                               
4
 While creating Taguchi designs, the values are entered in the order of minimum, maximum, and 
median values. 
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6.2 The Centralized and Decentralized Solutions 
After the final experimental design has been determined, for the 18 systems given in 
Table 6.2, the integer centralized and decentralized solutions are calculated as 
explained in Remark 4.1 and Remark 4.2, respectively. 
Table 6.3 presents the integer centralized and decentralized solutions. The numbers 
in bold denote the base stock levels of supplier j, where j is determined as explained 
in Remark 4.1.  
Notice that in each system, only the base stock level of supplier j differs in the 
centralized and decentralized solutions as stated before and int intj jS S
∗ ο<  as proved 
in Proposition 5.1 for the continuous case. Also, observe that in the systems where 
int intj iS S
ο ο
=  for some ,i j≠  j iρ ρ≥  as stated previously. 
Table 6.3: The centralized and decentralized solutions (in integer). 
No. 1int S
∗
 2int S
∗
 3int S
∗
 4int S
∗
 1int S
ο
 2int S
ο
 3int S
ο
 4int S
ο
 
1 1 7 7 5 2 7 7 5 
2 2 0 5 5 2 2 5 5 
3 6 5 0 1 6 5 1 1 
4 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
5 2 4 0 1 2 4 1 1 
6 3 11 11 8 4 11 11 8 
7 1 5 5 4 2 5 5 4 
8 4 0 8 6 4 3 8 6 
9 9 8 2 0 9 8 2 1 
10 0 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 
11 11 0 5 2 11 2 5 2 
12 3 5 1 2 3 5 2 2 
13 4 43 43 30 5 43 43 30 
14 0 22 22 17 3 22 22 17 
15 17 11 30 7 17 11 30 9 
16 37 30 7 0 37 30 7 2 
17 0 5 17 5 2 5 17 5 
18 4 7 7 1 4 7 7 3 
6.3 Comparison of the Centralized and Decentralized Systems 
In this section, the centralized and decentralized systems are compared based on the 
performance metrics presented in Table 6.1. The definitions and calculations of the 
metrics are given below. Notice that the expected values of the metrics are used to 
compare the two systems. 
 68
6.3.1 Total number of outstanding backorders 
Total number of outstanding backorders, which is denoted by ,TB  is the sum of the 
outstanding backorders at the suppliers and the manufacturer. From equations (3.33) 
and (3.42), the expected value of this metric is calculated as 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
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 (6.1) 
where 
1, ,
arg min .i
i n
j S
=
=
…
 
The comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems according to the 
average total number of outstanding backorders is presented in Table 6.4, where 
“Increase (%)” denotes the percentage increase of the decentralized system over the 
centralized system according to the relevant metric. 
Table 6.4: Comparison of the systems according to the average 
 total number of outstanding backorders. 
No. Average total number of outstanding backorders Centralized system Decentralized system Increase (%) 
1 0.2171 0.2086 −3.92 
2 1.7369 0.9069 −47.79 
3 1.6609 1.1254 −32.24 
4 1.1129 0.7337 −34.08 
5 1.4480 0.9149 −36.81 
6 0.3851 0.3720 −3.40 
7 1.3547 1.2478 −7.89 
8 2.7165 1.3345 −50.87 
9 2.2141 1.7481 −21.05 
10 1.5904 1.1243 −29.31 
11 2.3581 1.2728 −46.03 
12 1.8084 1.3730 −24.08 
13 1.0471 1.0314 −1.50 
14 4.4119 3.7800 −14.32 
15 5.1888 5.1639 −0.48 
16 6.7037 5.8129 −13.29 
17 3.3662 2.4753 −26.46 
18 5.3478 5.1032 −4.57 
Min 0.2171 0.2086 −50.87 
Max 6.7037 5.8129 −0.48 
Average 2.4816 1.9849 −22.12 
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Table 6.4 indicates that the average total number of outstanding backorders is higher 
in the centralized system than in the decentralized system for each case. Notice that 
in the centralized system, the base stock level of supplier j decreases (see Proposition 
5.1), increasing his average outstanding backorders, while reducing that of the 
manufacturer’s. On the other hand, the average numbers of outstanding backorders at 
the other suppliers remain the same. Consequently, as also depicted in Figure 6.1, the 
sum of all these terms increases in the centralized system. The results denote that 
according to the relevant metric, the minimum percentage increase of the 
decentralized system over the centralized system is calculated as −0.48%, the 
average increase as −22.12%, and the maximum increase as −50.87%.  
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Figure 6.1: The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized 
         system according to the average total number of outstanding backorders. 
6.3.2 Order fulfillment lead time 
Order fulfillment lead time is the number of time units from the customer order 
authorization to the customer order receipt. Under the queuing theory concept, 
Buzacott and Shanthikumar (1993) determine the distribution of the time to fill a 
demand in an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue under stationary conditions.  
Recall that each supplier is modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-stock queue in this 
thesis and let iL  denote the order fulfillment lead time for supplier i, where 
1, , 4.i = …  Then, from Buzacott and Shanthikumar (1993),  
{ } ( ) , 0,ii xSi iP L x e xµ λρ − −> = ≥  (6.2) 
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giving the expected value 
[ ] , 1, , 4.i
S
i
i
i
E L iρ
µ λ= =− …  (6.3) 
Also recall that the manufacturer is modeled as a / /1GI M  queue and 
Mq
N  denotes 
the number of jobs in the manufacturer’s queue, i.e., the outstanding backorders at 
the manufacturer. Then, if ML  denotes the order fulfillment lead time for the 
manufacturer, using Little’s formula it is easy to prove that  
[ ] 1 .MqM
M
E N
E L λ µ
  
= +  (6.4) 
Finally, the expected value of the order fulfillment lead time for the overall system, 
denoted by ,SL  can be expressed as 
[ ] [ ]
1, ,4
max .S i Mi
E L E L E L
=
 
= +
  …
 (6.5) 
In this thesis, two different approximations are considered to calculate the expected 
value of the maximum of suppliers’ order fulfillment lead times, which is needed to 
calculate [ ]SE L  from equation (6.5). In the first approximation, it is assumed that the 
order fulfillment lead times of the suppliers are independent from each other. If L  
denotes their maximum, then from 
{ } { }4
1
, 0,i
i
P L x P L x x
=
< = < ≥∏  (6.6) 
the expected value of L  can be calculated, where { }iP L x<  is found using equation 
(6.2). However, since the suppliers are triggered by the same arrival process, actually 
they are not independent. According to Zhao and Simchi-Levi (2006), the order 
fulfillment lead time in a single product assembly system with dependent component 
delays is stochastically smaller than the order fulfillment lead time in an analogous 
system with independent component delays. Consequently, this approximation 
overestimates the maximum of suppliers’ order fulfillment lead times. 
Therefore, a second approximation is also used such that the expected value of the 
maximum of suppliers’ order fulfillment lead times is equal to the maximum of their
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expected values given in equation (6.3). However, such an approximation is known 
to be underestimating. 
Since the first approximation overestimates and the second one underestimates, 
taking their average is expected to give a better result. Therefore, their average is 
used to find the expected value of the maximum of suppliers’ order fulfillment lead 
times. Then, by substituting this value and [ ]ME L  found from equation (6.4) into 
equation (6.5), the expected value of the order fulfillment lead time for the overall 
system is calculated. 
The comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems according to the 
average order fulfillment lead time is presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Comparison of the systems according to the 
       average order fulfillment lead time. 
No. Average order fulfillment lead time Centralized system Decentralized system Increase (%) 
1 0.4720 0.4688 −0.67 
2 1.6861 0.9303 −44.83 
3 1.6479 1.1596 −29.63 
4 1.1407 0.8525 −25.26 
5 1.6352 1.1219 −31.39 
6 0.7276 0.7224 −0.72 
7 1.2999 1.2743 −1.97 
8 2.7131 1.4181 −47.73 
9 1.8885 1.7108 −9.41 
10 1.6846 1.2544 −25.54 
11 2.6542 1.5919 −40.02 
12 2.0429 1.6240 −20.51 
13 1.4100 1.4041 −0.42 
14 3.3810 3.2320 −4.41 
15 4.5380 4.5318 −0.14 
16 5.7523 5.5531 −3.46 
17 2.9633 2.6263 −11.37 
18 5.4055 5.3801 −0.47 
Min 0.4720 0.4688 −47.73 
Max 5.7523 5.5531 −0.14 
Average 2.3913 2.0476 −16.55 
Table 6.5 points out that the average order fulfillment lead time is higher in the 
centralized system than in the decentralized system for each case. This situation can 
also be interpreted in a similar way as the increase of the total number of outstanding 
backorders in the centralized system. According to the average order fulfillment lead 
time, the minimum percentage increase of the decentralized system over the 
centralized system is calculated as −0.14%, the average increase as −16.55%, and the 
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maximum increase as −47.73%. The percentage increases are also represented in 
Figure 6.2. 
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 Figure 6.2: The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized 
         system according to the average order fulfillment lead time. 
6.3.3 Supply chain response time 
Supply chain response time is the amount of time it takes a supply chain to respond 
to an unplanned significant increase or decrease in demand without cost penalty 
(Bolstorff and Rosenbaum, 2003). In this thesis, the increase in demand is taken as 
10%. Accordingly, this metric calculates the amount of increase in the order 
fulfillment lead time when λ  rises to 1.10. Therefore, first the expected values of the 
new order fulfillment lead times are calculated as explained in section 6.3.2. Then, 
the differences between the new values and the ones given in Table 6.5 are 
calculated, giving the average supply chain response times. 
The comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems according to the 
average supply chain response time is given in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 denotes that the average supply chain response times are generally (in 13 
of the 18 cases) lower in the centralized system than in the decentralized system, i.e., 
the centralized system responds to a 10% increase in demand more quickly. Notice 
that the response times dramatically rise for systems 13-18, since at least one of the 
suppliers has a traffic intensity of 0.99 when the demand increases by 10% in these 
systems.  
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Table 6.6: Comparison of the systems according to the 
       average supply chain response time. 
No. Average supply chain response time Centralized system Decentralized system Increase (%) 
1 0.0881 0.0884 0.34 
2 0.2308 0.2213 −4.10 
3 0.2100 0.2163 3.01 
4 0.1078 0.1643 52.35 
5 0.1934 0.1953 1.02 
6 0.2410 0.2402 −0.31 
7 0.5786 0.5883 1.66 
8 0.6771 0.6195 −8.51 
9 0.5242 0.5948 13.47 
10 0.2703 0.3582 32.52 
11 0.5867 0.5456 −7.00 
12 0.5780 0.5360 −7.26 
13 98.1802 98.1899 0.01 
14 108.7690 109.0387 0.25 
15 110.7346 110.7441 0.01 
16 109.0396 109.2991 0.24 
17 73.9594 74.2758 0.43 
18 79.5465 79.6196 0.09 
Min 0.0881 0.0884 −8.51 
Max 110.7346 110.7441 52.35 
Average 32.4731 32.5297 4.35 
The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized system 
according to the average supply chain response time is also depicted in Figure 6.3. 
According to this metric, the minimum increase is calculated as −8.51%, the average 
increase as 4.35%, and the maximum increase as 52.35%.  
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Figure 6.3: The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized 
         system according to the average supply chain response time. 
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6.3.4 Total backorder and holding costs 
From equations (3.33), (3.34), and (3.42), the expected value of the total backorder 
and holding costs is given by 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
4 4
1 1
14 4
1 1
122
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1
1 1
1 1 2 12
,
1 2 1 1
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i n
j S
=
=
…
 
Table 6.7 presents the comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems 
according to the average total backorder and holding costs. 
Table 6.7: Comparison of the systems according to the 
       average total backorder and holding costs. 
No. Average total backorder and holding costs Centralized system Decentralized system Increase (%) 
1 65.5971 66.1820 0.89 
2 132.2308 140.3867 6.17 
3 113.7549 117.7113 3.48 
4 111.8585 116.3214 3.99 
5 106.2978 108.3283 1.91 
6 127.8397 128.0887 0.19 
7 314.6279 320.5158 1.87 
8 252.9050 263.3618 4.13 
9 207.3459 212.6975 2.58 
10 201.8388 207.1904 2.65 
11 213.1738 222.9510 4.59 
12 192.1756 197.3586 2.70 
13 300.2937 300.5390 0.08 
14 898.9457 914.1856 1.70 
15 681.6098 682.4440 0.12 
16 497.9630 512.2474 2.87 
17 457.4969 471.7813 3.12 
18 425.4746 432.7779 1.72 
Min 65.5971 66.1820 0.08 
Max 898.9457 914.1856 6.17 
Average 294.5239 300.8371 2.49 
Table 6.7 indicates that the average total backorder and holding costs is lower in the 
centralized system than in the decentralized system for each case. This result is 
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predictable since the models are based on cost minimization. According to the 
relevant metric, the minimum percentage increase of the decentralized system over 
the centralized system is calculated as 0.08%, the average increase as 2.49%, and the 
maximum increase as 6.17%. The percentage increase in the cost of the decentralized 
system over the centralized system is generally referred to as “competition penalty” 
in the literature, which is also represented in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4: The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized 
         system according to the average total backorder and holding costs. 
6.3.5 Inventory days of supply 
Inventory days of supply is the number of days that cash is tied up as inventory 
(Bolstorff and Rosenbaum, 2003). This metric is calculated as  
Average aggregate value of inventoryAverage inventory days of supply .
Annual cost of goods sold 365 days
=  (6.8) 
In the computation of average inventory days of supply, some values are needed that 
are not included in the models; and these values are derived as follows, where 
1, , 4 :i = …  
i. The unit cost of supplier i is determined such that ih  is 10%−40% of the unit cost.  
ii. The selling price of supplier i, i.e., the direct material cost of the manufacturer 
based on supplier i, is determined such that ib  is 25%−80% of the selling price.  
iii. The value of unit inventory of supplier i is the direct material cost of the 
manufacturer based on supplier i. Then, the average value of inventory for a supplier 
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is calculated by multiplying his average inventory level with the corresponding value 
of unit inventory.  
iv. Cost of goods sold (COGS) is taken as 1.40 times of the total direct material cost 
of the manufacturer. Since 0 1iρ< <  for 1, , 4,i = …  0 1,Mρ< <  and 1,λ =  assuming 
that one demand arrives per hour, it is expected that also one unit is sold per hour. 
Then, if there are 2080 working hours in a year, the expected number of units sold 
per year is also 2080. Therefore, annual COGS is calculated by multiplying COGS 
with 2080.  
The data used to calculate the average inventory days of supply is given in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Data used to calculate the average inventory days of supply. 
No. 
Unit costs of the suppliers Direct material cost of the 
manufacturer based on 
Total 
direct 
material 
cost 
COGS 
Sup. 1 Sup. 2 Sup. 3 Sup. 4 Sup. 1 Sup. 2 Sup. 3 Sup. 4 
1 10 10 10 10 125 125 125 31 406 569 
2 75 50 10 10 125 63 63 250 500 700 
3 10 10 50 75 125 63 63 125 375 525 
4 50 10 25 10 63 125 63 125 375 525 
5 100 10 50 100 250 125 63 250 688 963 
6 10 10 10 10 125 125 125 31 406 569 
7 75 75 75 50 125 125 125 63 438 613 
8 75 50 10 10 125 63 63 250 500 700 
9 10 10 50 75 125 63 63 125 375 525 
10 50 10 25 10 63 125 63 125 375 525 
11 10 50 10 100 250 63 125 250 688 963 
12 100 10 50 100 250 125 63 250 688 963 
13 10 10 10 10 125 125 125 31 406 569 
14 75 75 75 50 125 125 125 63 438 613 
15 75 50 10 10 125 63 63 250 500 700 
16 10 10 50 75 125 63 63 125 375 525 
17 50 10 25 10 63 125 63 125 375 525 
18 100 10 50 100 250 125 63 250 688 963 
Table 6.9 presents the comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems 
according to the average inventory days of supply. 
Table 6.9 points out that the average inventory days of supply is lower in the 
centralized system than in the decentralized system for each case. Recall that in the 
centralized system, the base stock level of supplier j decreases, whereas the base 
stock levels of the other suppliers remain the same. Therefore, this result is 
predictable.  
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Table 6.9: Comparison of the systems according to the 
       average inventory days of supply. 
No. Average inventory days of supply Centralized system Decentralized system Increase (%) 
1 0.5188 0.5570 7.36 
2 0.3681 0.3861 4.88 
3 0.3063 0.3157 3.07 
4 0.1819 0.1944 6.89 
5 0.1830 0.1881 2.80 
6 0.8480 0.8860 4.48 
7 0.2982 0.3296 10.54 
8 0.4837 0.5085 5.12 
9 0.4383 0.4592 4.77 
10 0.3396 0.3501 3.08 
11 0.5715 0.5815 1.76 
12 0.2621 0.2684 2.40 
13 2.9602 2.9981 1.28 
14 1.1647 1.2455 6.94 
15 1.0556 1.1793 11.71 
16 1.6723 1.7158 2.60 
17 0.5492 0.5709 3.96 
18 0.3004 0.3782 25.89 
Min 0.1819 0.1881 1.28 
Max 2.9602 2.9981 25.89 
Average 0.6946 0.7285 6.08 
The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized system 
according to the average inventory days of supply is also depicted in Figure 6.5. 
According to this metric, the minimum increase is calculated as 1.28%, the average 
increase as 6.08%, and the maximum increase as 25.89%.  
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 Figure 6.5: The percentage increase of the decentralized system over the centralized 
         system according to the average inventory days of supply. 
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Notice that for all the performance metrics considered in this thesis, the less the 
better. The results denote that the decentralized system has a better performance than 
the centralized system according to the total number of outstanding backorders and 
the order fulfillment lead time, which are customer-facing metrics. On the other 
hand, according to the internal-facing metrics, which are the total backorder and 
holding costs and the inventory days of supply, the centralized system has a better 
performance in all cases. Finally, if there is a 10% increase in demand, the 
centralized system generally responds to this increase more quickly. Therefore, 
according to the supply chain response time, which is also a customer-facing metric, 
the centralized system generally has a better performance than the decentralized 
system. 
6.4 Selection Among the Centralized and Decentralized Systems 
In section 6.3, the centralized and decentralized systems are compared based on five 
performance metrics presented in Table 6.1; and in this section, a multi-criteria 
decision making method is used to decide which system is more preferable. For this 
purpose, the simple additive weighting (SAW) method is selected.  
According to Yoon and Hwang (1995), among the multi-criteria decision making 
methods such as SAW, weighted product method, TOPSIS or ELECTRE, no one has 
a significant dominance over another. Therefore, and also since its implementation is 
simple, the SAW method is preferred in this thesis. 
To select among the centralized and decentralized systems, the average of the data 
given in Tables 6.4-6.7 and 6.9 is used as presented in Table 6.10.  
Table 6.10: The average values of the performance metrics for 
   the centralized and decentralized systems. 
Performance metrics Centralized system Decentralized system 
Total number of outstanding backorders 2.4816 1.9849 
Order fulfillment lead time 2.3913 2.0476 
Supply chain response time 32.4731 32.5297 
Total backorder and holding costs 294.5239 300.8371 
Inventory days of supply 0.6946 0.7285 
To apply the SAW method, first the data has to be normalized. In this thesis, the 
Manhattan distance based normalization method (Ginevičius and Podvezko, 2008; 
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Triantaphyllou, 2000, pp. 138-139) is preferred to normalize the data since it is 
simple to interpret and it conserves proportionality.  
In the SAW method, the value of alternative i can be expressed as 
1
, 1, , ,
n
i j ij
j
V w r i m
=
= =∑ …  (6.9) 
where iV  is the value of alternative i; ijr  is the normalized value of alternative i in 
terms of criterion j; and jw  is the weight of criterion j. Notice that the weights of the 
criteria should add up to one. 
Additionally, in the Manhattan distance based normalization, the normalized values 
are calculated by 
1
, 1, , , 1, , ,ijij m
ij
i
v
r i m j n
v
=
= = =
∑
… …  (6.10) 
where ijv  is the value of alternative i in terms of criterion j. 
Table 6.11 presents the normalized values of the alternatives in terms of each 
criterion. In Table 6.11, iA  denotes alternative i, where 1i =  for the centralized 
system and 2i =  for the decentralized system. Besides, jC  denotes criterion j, where 
1j =  for the total number of outstanding backorders; 2j =  for the order fulfillment 
lead time; 3j =  for the supply chain response time; 4j =  for the total backorder and 
holding costs; and 5j =  for the inventory days of supply. 
Table 6.11: The normalized values of the alternatives in terms of each criterion. 
Alternatives 
Criteria 
1C  2C  3C  4C  5C  
1A  0.5556 0.5387 0.4996 0.4947 0.4881 
2A  0.4444 0.4613 0.5004 0.5053 0.5119 
Since each performance metric is equally important in the SCOR model, the weight 
of each criterion is taken equal to each other, i.e., 0.20jw =  for all 1, ,5,j = …  while 
applying the SAW method. Then, using equation (6.9) and the data given in Table 
6.11, the values of the alternatives are calculated as 1 0.5153V =  and 2 0.4847.V =  
Recall that the less the better for all criteria, giving that the alternative with the 
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minimum value has to be selected. Then, since 2 1,V V<  it is concluded that the 
decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system. 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the previous section, when each criterion is taken as equally important, it is found 
that the decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system according to 
the five criteria given in Table 6.11. In addition, this section presents a sensitivity 
analysis performed in a similar way as explained in Triantaphyllou (2000). 
The objective of the sensitivity analysis is to determine the most sensitive criterion. 
First, from equations (6.11a) and (6.11b), the minimum change jδ  in the current 
weight jw  of criterion j is calculated for each 1, ,5j = …  so that the ranking of the 
alternatives 1A  and 2A  is reversed: 
1 2
1 2
1 2
, if , 1, ,5,j j j
j j
V V
r r j
r r
δ −< < =
−
…   (6.11a) 
1 2
1 2
1 2
, if , 1, ,5,j j j
j j
V V
r r j
r r
δ −> > =
−
…  (6.11b) 
where 1V  and 2V  are calculated from equation (6.9); 1 jr  and 2 jr  are calculated from 
equation (6.10). Notice that only the weight of criterion j is modified each time, 
while the weights of the other criteria remain the same. Also note that 2 1V V<  in the 
current situation as given in the previous section. 
After calculating jδ  for each 1, ,5,j = …  the new weight jw∗  of each criterion j is 
calculated by  
, 1, ,5,j j jw w jδ∗ = − = …  (6.12) 
giving the following results. Notice that [ ]0,1jw∗ ∉  for 1, ,5j = …  since these are the 
values obtained before normalization: 
i. 1 0.0758,w∗ < −  indicating that the ranking of the alternatives 1A  and 2A  is reversed 
for 1w  smaller than −0.0758. However, since 1w  is infeasible in this interval, it is not 
possible to change the ranking of the alternatives by changing 1.w  This situation can 
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also be seen in Figure 6.6. Notice that for all feasible values of 1,w  the decentralized 
system is preferred over the centralized system, i.e., the ranking of the alternatives 
does not change. Also note that in Figure 6.6, the weights after normalization are 
considered; and the values of the alternatives are calculated using the normalized 
weights5. 
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Figure 6.6: The values of the alternatives as a function of 1w  after normalization. 
ii. 2 0.1960,w
∗ < −  pointing out that it is also impossible to alter the ranking of the 
alternatives by changing 2w  as depicted in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: The values of the alternatives as a function of 2w  after normalization. 
                                               
5
 This is also valid for Figures 6.7-6.10. 
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iii. 3 35.3690w
∗ >  (corresponds to greater than 0.9779 after normalization), meaning 
that for 3w  belonging to this interval, the ranking of the alternatives 1A  and 2A  is 
reversed as represented in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8: The values of the alternatives as a function of 3w  after normalization. 
iv. 4 3.0918w
∗ >  (corresponds to greater than 0.7944 after normalization), indicating 
that when 4w  takes a value in this interval, the ranking of the alternatives 1A  and 2A  
changes as depicted in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9: The values of the alternatives as a function of 4w  after normalization. 
v. 5 1.4870w
∗ >  (corresponds to greater than 0.6502 after normalization), meaning 
that the ranking of the alternatives 1A  and 2A  is reversed for 5w  belonging to this 
interval. This result can also be seen in Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10: The values of the alternatives as a function of 5w  after normalization. 
In summary, if each criterion is taken as equally important, it is found that the 
decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system. The results denote that 
when the weight of criterion j is modified and the others remain the same for 
1, ,5,j = …  changing the values of 1w  or 2w  cannot alter this ranking. However, for 
3 35.3690,w∗ >  4 3.0918,w∗ >  or 5 1.4870,w∗ >  the ranking of the alternatives changes 
and the centralized system becomes more preferred over the decentralized system.  
Calculating the minimum percentage increases between the current and new weights 
of the criteria gives 17584.49%, 1445.89%, and 643.48% for 3,4,5,j =  respectively. 
Notice that since 1w
∗
 and 2w
∗
 are not feasible, they are not included in this 
calculation. Then, the most sensitive criterion is the one for which the minimum 
percentage increase between its current and new weights is the smallest among the 
others.  
Consequently, the inventory days of supply is the most sensitive criterion; and it is 
followed by the total backorder and holding costs, and the supply chain response 
time, respectively. On the other hand, the total number of outstanding backorders and 
the order fulfillment lead time are insensitive to the ranking of the alternatives. 
Now, let us design an experiment, where { }1,2,5,10,20jw ∈  before normalization 
for 1, ,5.j = …  For this purpose, a full factorial design is created using Minitab 15 
with 3125 runs. First, the weights of the criteria are normalized so that they add up to 
one. Then, using the normalized weights and the data given in Table 6.11, the value 
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of each alternative is calculated. The results denote that in 2901 of the 3125 cases, 
the decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system, giving a percentage 
of 92.83%. 
Finally, the results of the numerical study can be summarized as follows: 
i. The decentralized system has a better performance than the centralized system 
according to the total number of outstanding backorders and the order fulfillment 
lead time, which are customer-facing metrics. On the other hand, the centralized 
system performs better according to the internal-facing metrics, which are the total 
backorder and holding costs and the inventory days of supply. Finally, according to 
the supply chain response time, which is also a customer-facing metric, it is found 
that the centralized system generally has a better performance than the decentralized 
system.  
ii. When each criterion is taken as equally important, the decentralized system is 
preferred over the centralized system.  
iii. The sensitivity analysis denotes that by altering the weights of the total number of 
outstanding backorders and the order fulfillment lead time, the ranking of the 
alternatives cannot be changed, i.e., the decentralized system is always preferred over 
the centralized system. On the other hand, the centralized system becomes more 
preferred than the decentralized system if and only if a decision maker assigns a 
weight greater than 0.9779 to the supply chain response time; a weight greater than 
0.7944 to the total backorder and holding costs; or a weight greater than 0.6502 to 
the inventory days of supply.  
iv. According to the experiment designed in this chapter, it is found that the 
decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system in 92.83% of all cases.  
Consequently, in this thesis it is concluded that the decentralized system is more 
preferable than the centralized system due to the following reasons: (i) By altering 
the weights of two criteria, the centralized system cannot be more preferred than the 
decentralized system; (ii) the minimum weights needed to make the centralized 
system more preferable are high for the other three criteria; and (iii) the experiment 
gives a very high percentage for the cases where the decentralized system is 
preferred over the centralized system. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This thesis investigates a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple 
independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The 
suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage 
their inventories. On the other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order 
strategy. The aim of this thesis is to coordinate the inventory policies of the suppliers 
in the supply chain. 
Assuming that the end customer demands occur according to a Poisson process, and 
the service times of the suppliers and the manufacturer are i.i.d. and exponentially 
distributed random variables, each supplier is modeled as an / /1M M  make-to-
stock queue. Furthermore, the average outstanding backorders and the average 
inventory level of each supplier are derived using the queuing model. 
On the other hand, the interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer has to be 
derived to model the manufacturer as a queuing system. Therefore, first the exact 
distributions in the case of one supplier and two suppliers are derived. However, 
deriving the distribution of the interarrival times of the manufacturer becomes 
mathematically intractable as the number of suppliers increases. Thus, an 
approximate distribution is developed for a system with two or more suppliers. The 
idea behind the approximation is the expectation that the supplier with the minimum 
base stock level affects the interarrival times of the manufacturer the most. 
For testing the precision of the approximate interarrival time distribution of the 
manufacturer, simulation models are developed in the case of two, three, and four 
suppliers. The results denote that the approximate distribution produces an error of 
2.47%, denoting that it can be reasonably used as the interarrival time distribution of 
the manufacturer. Then, the manufacturer is modeled as a / /1GI M  queue under the 
assumption that the arrivals to the manufacturer form a renewal process. Moreover, 
the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system and the average outstanding 
backorders at the manufacturer are obtained using the queuing model. 
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After the supply chain has been modeled as a queuing network, the centralized and 
decentralized systems are taken into account. Notice that the centralized system is 
also considered in this thesis since the centralized solution is used as a reference 
point for the performance of the decentralized system. 
In the centralized model, the objective of the single decision maker is to minimize 
the average total backorder and holding costs per unit time for the overall system. 
The decision variables are the base stock levels of the suppliers. Since the suppliers 
apply base stock policy to manage their inventories, throughout the thesis it is 
assumed that the optimal base stock levels of the suppliers are not equal to zero.  
After constructing the centralized model, the unique global optimal solution to the 
model is found. Although this solution ignores the integrality of the base stock levels 
of the suppliers, the way of finding the optimal integer solution to the centralized 
model is also defined. 
On the other hand, in the decentralized model, the objective of each member of the 
supply chain is to minimize the average cost per unit time for his own system. 
Therefore, each supplier tries to minimize his average backorder and holding costs 
per unit time. However, since the decision variables are the base stock levels of the 
suppliers, the manufacturer is not included in the decentralized model. Nevertheless, 
the decision of the supplier with the minimum base stock level also affects the 
manufacturer. 
After the decentralized model has been developed, the unique global optimal solution 
to the decentralized model for each supplier is derived. Similar to the centralized 
case, the optimal integer solution to the decentralized model can also be found easily. 
When the centralized and decentralized solutions are compared, it is concluded that 
only the supplier with the minimum base stock level needs coordination. Therefore, 
contracts are prepared between that supplier and the manufacturer.  
Three different transfer payment contracts are studied in this thesis. These are the 
backorder cost subsidy contract, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto 
improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to 
its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. If a contract is not 
Pareto improving even it coordinates the supply chain, then at least one of the 
members of the supply chain will not desire to participate in the contract. 
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It is proved that all three contracts have the ability to coordinate the supply chain. 
However, they differ in whether they are Pareto improving or not. It is found that 
only the backorder cost subsidy contract is not Pareto improving. Among the other 
two contracts, in the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, only 
the supplier is better off after the contract and the manufacturer remains the same. On 
the other hand, in the cost sharing contract, both the supplier and the manufacturer 
can be better off after the transfer payment for an appropriately selected contract 
parameter. Therefore, the cost sharing contract seems to be more advantageous to 
both members.  
In this thesis, also a numerical study is performed to compare the centralized and 
decentralized systems based on SCOR Model performance metrics. The performance 
metrics are chosen such that exactly one metric is associated with exactly one of the 
SCOR Model performance attributes, which are reliability, responsiveness, 
flexibility, cost, and assets. Then, the corresponding performance metrics are 
determined as the total number of outstanding backorders, the order fulfillment lead 
time, the supply chain response time, the total backorder and holding costs, and the 
inventory days of supply, respectively. 
The results of the numerical study point out that the decentralized system has a better 
performance than the centralized system according to the total number of outstanding 
backorders and the order fulfillment lead time, which are customer-facing metrics. 
On the other hand, the centralized system performs better according to the internal-
facing metrics, which are the total backorder and holding costs and the inventory 
days of supply. Finally, according to the supply chain response time, which is also a 
customer-facing metric, it is found that the centralized system generally has a better 
performance than the decentralized system. 
After the centralized and decentralized systems have been compared based on five 
performance metrics, a multi-criteria decision making method is used to decide 
which system is more preferable. For this purpose, the simple additive weighting 
method is selected. When each criterion is taken as equally important, it is found that 
the decentralized system is preferred over the centralized system. Then, a sensitivity 
analysis is performed to determine the most sensitive criterion. The results indicate 
that the inventory days of supply is the most sensitive criterion; and it is followed by 
the total backorder and holding costs, and the supply chain response time, 
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respectively. On the other hand, the total number of outstanding backorders and the 
order fulfillment lead time are insensitive to the ranking of the alternatives. The 
results obtained from the sensitivity analysis also point out that the decentralized 
system is more preferable than the centralized system. 
To summarize, the main contributions of this thesis are 
i. The derivation of the approximate interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer 
in the presence of two or more suppliers, and accordingly finding the approximate 
performance measures of the manufacturer such as the average number of jobs in the 
manufacturer’s system and the average outstanding backorders at the manufacturer; 
ii. The development of the transfer payment contracts to coordinate the inventory 
policies in a capacitated supply chain with multiple suppliers. 
Finally, the future research directions can be given as follows: 
i. Considering competing suppliers and using a game-theoretic framework to 
examine the coordination issues. Notice that the suppliers considered in this thesis 
are independent and noncompeting. As a further study, games within the suppliers 
and also between the suppliers and the manufacturer can be incorporated into the 
models. 
ii. Studying other types of incentives that may coordinate the supply chain. 
iii. Developing a lost sales model. 
iv. Incorporating also other performance metrics into the models so that the optimal 
base stock levels of the suppliers are calculated by taking different performance 
metrics into consideration.  
v. Relaxing the assumptions that the end customer demands occur according to a 
Poisson process, or the service times of the suppliers and the manufacturer are i.i.d. 
and exponentially distributed random variables. Although the exact solution for such 
an extension cannot be found in the case of a capacitated supplier, approximations 
and simulation methods can be used as also adopted in this thesis. 
vi. Relaxing the assumption that the transfer times between the suppliers and the 
manufacturer are negligible. 
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APPENDIX A 
i. Transfer times between the suppliers and the manufacturer are negligible. 
ii. End customer demands arrive in single units according to a Poisson process with 
rate .λ  
iii. Supplier i and the manufacturer have i.i.d. and exponentially distributed service 
times with rate iµ  for 1, ,i n= …  and ,Mµ  respectively. 
iv. For the stability of the system, 0 1iρ< <  for 1, ,i n= …  and 0 1,Mρ< <  where iρ  
and Mρ  denote the traffic intensities of supplier i and the manufacturer, respectively. 
v. X and iY  for 1, ,i n= …  are independent from each other, where X denotes the time 
between demands and iY  denotes the time until the next service completion for 
supplier i. 
vi. In the case of two suppliers, their states are conditionally independent from each 
other given both components have been departed from the suppliers. 
vii. Arrivals to the manufacturer form a renewal process. 
viii. 0ib >  and 0ih >  for 1, , ,i n= …  and 0,Mb >  where ib  denotes the backorder 
cost per unit backordered at supplier i per unit time; Mb  denotes the backorder cost 
per unit backordered at the manufacturer per unit time; and ih  denotes the holding 
cost per unit inventory per unit time for supplier i. 
ix. The optimal base stock levels of the suppliers are not equal to zero.  
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APPENDIX B 
For testing the precision of the approximate interarrival time distribution of the 
manufacturer presented in equation (3.29), simulation models are developed in the 
case of two, three, and four suppliers. 
In each case, the end customer demand rate is set to one. Three different values are 
used for the traffic intensities of the suppliers and the manufacturer: 0.50, 0.67, and 
0.80. The base stock levels of the suppliers can also take on three values: 3, 5, and 7. 
Since considering all the combinations is too time consuming, Taguchi designs are 
created using Minitab 15, each with 27 runs.  
The simulation models are developed using Arena 9.0. The replication length of each 
run is 10,000 time units and the number of replications is set to 10.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is used to test the precision of the approximate 
interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer. Tables B.1-B.3 present the K-S test 
statistics and p-values for the approximate distribution in the case of two, three, and 
four suppliers, respectively. If more than one supplier has the minimum base stock 
level, the supplier with the highest traffic intensity is taken into consideration among 
these suppliers. The tables also include the results for the exponential distribution 
since most of the studies in the literature use the exponential distribution to 
approximate the interarrival times of the manufacturer in the presence of one 
supplier.  
In Tables B.1-B.3, the p-values that are not significant at the 0.01 level are marked in 
bold. The results denote that the exponential distribution fits the interarrival time data 
of the manufacturer in just 23 of the 81 cases, giving an error of 71.60%. On the 
other hand, the approximate distribution fits the data in 79 of the 81 cases, producing 
an error of just 2.47%. Also, the distribution of the errors among the models for two, 
three, and four suppliers are balanced. Consequently, the results denote that the 
interarrival time distribution of the manufacturer can be approximated as given in 
equation (3.29). 
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Table B.1: K-S test statistics and p-values in the case of two suppliers. 
No Mρ  1ρ  2ρ  1S  2S  
Exponential dis. Approximate dis. 
p K-S p K-S 
1 0.50 0.50 0.50 3 3 0.0001 0.0225 0.5115 0.0082 
2 0.50 0.50 0.50 3 5 0.0329 0.0143 0.1278 0.0117 
3 0.50 0.50 0.50 3 7 0.0584 0.0133 0.0946 0.0123 
4 0.50 0.67 0.67 5 3 0.0003 0.0209 0.5030 0.0082 
5 0.50 0.67 0.67 5 5 0.0178 0.0153 0.7198 0.0069 
6 0.50 0.67 0.67 5 7 0.2628 0.0100 0.4888 0.0083 
7 0.50 0.80 0.80 7 3 0.0025 0.0182 0.1105 0.0120 
8 0.50 0.80 0.80 7 5 0.0047 0.0173 0.4339 0.0087 
9 0.50 0.80 0.80 7 7 0.1100 0.0120 0.7364 0.0068 
10 0.67 0.50 0.80 5 3 0.0000 0.0233 0.6792 0.0072 
11 0.67 0.50 0.80 5 5 0.2016 0.0106 0.0984 0.0122 
12 0.67 0.50 0.80 5 7 0.3616 0.0093 0.4803 0.0084 
13 0.67 0.67 0.50 7 3 0.0113 0.0160 0.1582 0.0112 
14 0.67 0.67 0.50 7 5 0.1153 0.0119 0.0783 0.0127 
15 0.67 0.67 0.50 7 7 0.2876 0.0098 0.1358 0.0116 
16 0.67 0.80 0.67 3 3 0.0017 0.0186 0.1097 0.0119 
17 0.67 0.80 0.67 3 5 0.0064 0.0168 0.1902 0.0108 
18 0.67 0.80 0.67 3 7 0.0801 0.0126 0.0685 0.0129 
19 0.80 0.50 0.67 7 3 0.0105 0.0160 0.0423 0.0137 
20 0.80 0.50 0.67 7 5 0.0595 0.0131 0.1438 0.0114 
21 0.80 0.50 0.67 7 7 0.0348 0.0141 0.0595 0.0131 
22 0.80 0.67 0.80 3 3 0.0000 0.0236 0.3593 0.0092 
23 0.80 0.67 0.80 3 5 0.0005 0.0203 0.4518 0.0085 
24 0.80 0.67 0.80 3 7 0.0009 0.0196 0.6457 0.0074 
25 0.80 0.80 0.50 5 3 0.0016 0.0188 0.7671 0.0066 
26 0.80 0.80 0.50 5 5 0.1069 0.0120 0.4293 0.0087 
27 0.80 0.80 0.50 5 7 0.1702 0.0110 0.2311 0.0103 
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Table B.2: K-S test statistics and p-values in the case of three suppliers. 
No Mρ  1ρ  2ρ  3ρ  1S  2S  3S  
Exponential dis. Approximate dis. 
p K-S p K-S 
1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 3 3 3 0.0003 0.0209 0.0521 0.0133 
2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 3 5 5 0.0004 0.0205 0.6993 0.0070 
3 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.80 3 7 7 0.0037 0.0176 0.8235 0.0063 
4 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.50 5 3 3 0.0000 0.0350 0.0304 0.0144 
5 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.67 5 5 5 0.0002 0.0211 0.0249 0.0146 
6 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.80 5 7 7 0.0095 0.0163 0.3130 0.0096 
7 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.50 7 3 3 0.0005 0.0201 0.1658 0.0110 
8 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.67 7 5 5 0.0000 0.0271 0.0287 0.0146 
9 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 7 7 7 0.0418 0.0138 0.5892 0.0077 
10 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.67 5 3 7 0.0000 0.0248 0.7105 0.0070 
11 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.80 5 5 3 0.0000 0.0233 0.0566 0.0132 
12 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.50 5 7 5 0.1086 0.0120 0.1468 0.0113 
13 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.67 7 3 7 0.0015 0.0190 0.9513 0.0052 
14 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.80 7 5 3 0.0092 0.0163 0.2703 0.0099 
15 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.50 7 7 5 0.3066 0.0096 0.5562 0.0079 
16 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.67 3 3 7 0.0000 0.0246 0.7983 0.0064 
17 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.80 3 5 3 0.0007 0.0198 0.1346 0.0115 
18 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.50 3 7 5 0.0000 0.0232 0.9924 0.0043 
19 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.80 7 3 5 0.0000 0.0259 0.3296 0.0095 
20 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.50 7 5 7 0.1636 0.0111 0.2247 0.0103 
21 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.67 7 7 3 0.0013 0.0189 0.2449 0.0101 
22 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.80 3 3 5 0.0000 0.0347 0.0041 0.0176 
23 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.50 3 5 7 0.0000 0.0248 0.6392 0.0074 
24 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.67 3 7 3 0.0000 0.0284 0.1397 0.0115 
25 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 5 3 5 0.0000 0.0235 0.4045 0.0089 
26 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.50 5 5 7 0.1703 0.0110 0.3815 0.0090 
27 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.67 5 7 3 0.0000 0.0233 0.5183 0.0081 
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Table B.3: K-S test statistics and p-values in the case of four suppliers. 
No Mρ  1ρ  2ρ  3ρ  4ρ  1S  2S  3S  4S  
Exponential dis. Approximate dis. 
p K-S p K-S 
1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 3 3 3 3 0.0000 0.0346 0.0003 0.0210 
2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.67 3 5 5 5 0.0000 0.0239 0.0105 0.0160 
3 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.80 0.80 3 7 7 7 0.0012 0.0191 0.4313 0.0086 
4 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.67 5 3 3 5 0.0000 0.0338 0.0457 0.0137 
5 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.80 5 5 5 7 0.0005 0.0202 0.1405 0.0115 
6 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.80 0.50 5 7 7 3 0.0000 0.0234 0.1520 0.0113 
7 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 7 3 3 7 0.0007 0.0196 0.0218 0.0148 
8 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.50 7 5 5 3 0.0000 0.0246 0.1354 0.0116 
9 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.67 7 7 7 5 0.0009 0.0197 0.1446 0.0115 
10 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.67 0.50 5 3 7 5 0.0000 0.0254 0.8136 0.0064 
11 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.80 0.67 5 5 3 7 0.0000 0.0230 0.3424 0.0093 
12 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.50 0.80 5 7 5 3 0.0000 0.0231 0.0728 0.0128 
13 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 7 3 7 7 0.0003 0.0206 0.0956 0.0122 
14 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.80 7 5 3 3 0.0000 0.0289 0.2581 0.0101 
15 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.50 7 7 5 5 0.0927 0.0123 0.3462 0.0093 
16 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.80 3 3 7 3 0.0000 0.0342 0.0150 0.0157 
17 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.50 3 5 3 5 0.0000 0.0229 0.1438 0.0113 
18 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.50 0.67 3 7 5 7 0.0015 0.0189 0.6753 0.0072 
19 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.80 0.50 7 3 5 7 0.0000 0.0330 0.0970 0.0123 
20 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.67 7 5 7 3 0.0000 0.0234 0.6290 0.0074 
21 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.80 7 7 3 5 0.0002 0.0213 0.2752 0.0099 
22 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.80 0.67 3 3 5 3 0.0000 0.0259 0.2974 0.0097 
23 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.50 0.80 3 5 7 5 0.0000 0.0324 0.0635 0.0132 
24 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.50 3 7 3 7 0.0000 0.0325 0.1090 0.0121 
25 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.80 5 3 5 5 0.0001 0.0228 0.3287 0.0094 
26 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.50 0.50 5 5 7 7 0.1523 0.0112 0.0486 0.0135 
27 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.67 0.67 5 7 3 3 0.0000 0.0297 0.2943 0.0097 
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APPENDIX C 
For selecting the best-fit approximation for the average number of jobs in the 
manufacturer’s system among the approximations given in equations (3.35)-(3.39), 
simulation models are developed in the case of two, three, and four suppliers as 
explained in Appendix B. 
Recall that the end customer demand rate is set to one in each case. Three different 
values are used for the traffic intensities of the suppliers and the manufacturer: 0.50, 
0.67, and 0.80. The base stock levels of the suppliers can also take on three values: 3, 
5, and 7. Since considering all the combinations is too time consuming, Taguchi 
designs are created using Minitab 15, each with 27 runs.  
The simulation models are developed using Arena 9.0. The replication length of each 
run is 10,000 time units and the number of replications is set to 10.  
In Tables C.1-C.3, the average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system obtained 
from the simulation results is compared with the approximations given in equations 
(3.35)-(3.39) in the case of two, three, and four suppliers, respectively. While 
calculating the approximate average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s system, 
the squared coefficient of variation of the interarrival times of the manufacturer is 
taken as given in equation (3.30). In addition, if more than one supplier has the 
minimum base stock level, the supplier with the highest traffic intensity is taken into 
consideration among these suppliers. 
Tables C.1-C.3 also present the errors between the approximations and the 
simulation results. The errors are absolute percentage values; and in the case of two, 
three, and four suppliers, the approximation of Marchal (1976) given in equation 
(3.36) has the minimum average errors of 2.74%, 3.28%, and 4.09%, respectively. 
The approximation presented in equation (3.38) follows with corresponding average 
errors of 2.81%, 3.36%, and 4.20%. There is a slight increase in the average errors as 
the number of suppliers gets larger, but this increase is acceptable. As a result, 
Marchal (1976)’s approximation is selected for the average number of jobs in the 
manufacturer’s system. 
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Table C.1: Average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s 
      system in the case of two suppliers. 
No Simul. 
results (3.35) 
Error 
(3.35) (3.36) 
Error 
(3.36) (3.37) 
Error 
(3.37) (3.38) 
Error 
(3.38) (3.39) 
Error 
(3.39) 
1 0.9126 0.9893 8.41 0.9833 7.75 0.9845 7.88 0.9844 7.87 0.9996 9.53 
2 0.9302 0.9893 6.35 0.9833 5.71 0.9845 5.84 0.9844 5.82 0.9996 7.46 
3 0.9358 0.9893 5.71 0.9833 5.08 0.9845 5.20 0.9844 5.19 0.9996 6.81 
4 0.9284 0.9790 5.46 0.9681 4.29 0.9704 4.53 0.9701 4.50 0.9984 7.55 
5 0.9402 0.9908 5.39 0.9857 4.84 0.9867 4.95 0.9866 4.94 0.9997 6.33 
6 0.9398 0.9908 5.43 0.9857 4.88 0.9867 4.99 0.9866 4.98 0.9997 6.37 
7 0.9545 0.9759 2.24 0.9636 0.96 0.9662 1.23 0.9659 1.19 0.9979 4.55 
8 0.9513 0.9849 3.53 0.9767 2.67 0.9784 2.84 0.9782 2.82 0.9992 5.03 
9 0.9521 0.9904 4.03 0.9851 3.47 0.9861 3.58 0.9860 3.56 0.9997 5.00 
10 1.9395 1.9665 1.40 1.9448 0.28 1.9511 0.60 1.9480 0.44 1.9961 2.92 
11 1.9648 1.9899 1.28 1.9756 0.55 1.9796 0.75 1.9776 0.65 2.0091 2.25 
12 1.9526 2.0232 3.61 2.0205 3.48 2.0212 3.51 2.0209 3.50 2.0267 3.79 
13 1.9800 2.0016 1.09 1.9912 0.56 1.9940 0.71 1.9926 0.64 2.0153 1.78 
14 2.0043 2.0232 0.94 2.0205 0.81 2.0212 0.84 2.0209 0.83 2.0267 1.12 
15 2.0172 2.0193 0.11 2.0152 0.10 2.0163 0.04 2.0158 0.07 2.0247 0.37 
16 1.8791 1.9665 4.65 1.9448 3.50 1.9511 3.83 1.9480 3.66 1.9961 6.22 
17 1.8774 1.9665 4.75 1.9448 3.59 1.9511 3.92 1.9480 3.76 1.9961 6.32 
18 1.9482 1.9665 0.94 1.9448 0.17 1.9511 0.14 1.9480 0.01 1.9961 2.46 
19 3.9516 3.8709 2.04 3.8446 2.71 3.8530 2.50 3.8471 2.65 3.9019 1.26 
20 3.7253 3.9425 5.83 3.9302 5.50 3.9340 5.60 3.9314 5.53 3.9566 6.21 
21 4.0059 3.9743 0.79 3.9687 0.93 3.9704 0.89 3.9692 0.92 3.9806 0.63 
22 3.7261 3.8522 3.38 3.8224 2.58 3.8320 2.84 3.8252 2.66 3.8875 4.33 
23 3.7382 3.8709 3.55 3.8446 2.85 3.8530 3.07 3.8471 2.91 3.9019 4.38 
24 3.7697 3.8709 2.68 3.8446 1.99 3.8530 2.21 3.8471 2.05 3.9019 3.51 
25 3.8162 3.9329 3.06 3.9187 2.69 3.9231 2.80 3.9200 2.72 3.9493 3.49 
26 3.9338 3.9059 0.71 3.8863 1.21 3.8925 1.05 3.8882 1.16 3.9287 0.13 
27 3.9189 3.9059 0.33 3.8863 0.83 3.8925 0.67 3.8882 0.78 3.9287 0.25 
Average error (%) 3.25 - 2.74 - 2.85 - 2.81 - 4.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
Table C.2: Average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s 
      system in the case of three suppliers. 
No Simul. 
results (3.35) 
Error 
(3.35) (3.36) 
Error 
(3.36) (3.37) 
Error 
(3.37) (3.38) 
Error 
(3.38) (3.39) 
Error 
(3.39) 
0.9354 0.9893 5.76 0.9833 5.13 0.9845 5.25 0.9844 5.24 0.9996 6.86 
2 0.9380 0.9893 5.46 0.9833 4.83 0.9845 4.95 0.9844 4.94 0.9996 6.56 
3 0.9377 0.9893 5.51 0.9833 4.87 0.9845 5.00 0.9844 4.98 0.9996 6.60 
4 0.9467 0.9790 3.42 0.9681 2.26 0.9704 2.50 0.9701 2.48 0.9984 5.46 
5 0.9285 0.9908 6.72 0.9857 6.16 0.9867 6.27 0.9866 6.26 0.9997 7.67 
6 0.9388 0.9908 5.54 0.9857 4.99 0.9867 5.10 0.9866 5.09 0.9997 6.48 
7 0.9618 0.9759 1.46 0.9636 0.18 0.9662 0.45 0.9659 0.42 0.9979 3.75 
8 0.9447 0.9849 4.25 0.9767 3.39 0.9784 3.56 0.9782 3.54 0.9992 5.76 
9 0.9476 0.9904 4.53 0.9851 3.96 0.9861 4.07 0.9860 4.06 0.9997 5.50 
10 1.9614 1.9665 0.26 1.9448 0.84 1.9511 0.53 1.9480 0.68 1.9961 1.77 
11 1.8994 1.9665 3.53 1.9448 2.39 1.9511 2.72 1.9480 2.55 1.9961 5.09 
12 1.9496 2.0232 3.78 2.0205 3.64 2.0212 3.68 2.0209 3.66 2.0267 3.95 
13 1.9039 2.0016 5.13 1.9912 4.59 1.9940 4.74 1.9926 4.66 2.0153 5.85 
14 1.9260 1.9665 2.11 1.9448 0.98 1.9511 1.30 1.9480 1.14 1.9961 3.64 
15 2.0272 2.0232 0.20 2.0205 0.33 2.0212 0.29 2.0209 0.31 2.0267 0.03 
16 1.8309 1.9665 7.41 1.9448 6.22 1.9511 6.56 1.9480 6.39 1.9961 9.02 
17 1.8788 1.9665 4.67 1.9448 3.52 1.9511 3.85 1.9480 3.68 1.9961 6.25 
18 1.9588 1.9665 0.39 1.9448 0.71 1.9511 0.40 1.9480 0.56 1.9961 1.90 
19 3.6205 3.8709 6.92 3.8446 6.19 3.8530 6.42 3.8471 6.26 3.9019 7.77 
20 3.8611 3.9425 2.11 3.9302 1.79 3.9340 1.89 3.9314 1.82 3.9566 2.47 
21 3.7635 3.8709 2.85 3.8446 2.16 3.8530 2.38 3.8471 2.22 3.9019 3.68 
22 3.6737 3.8522 4.86 3.8224 4.05 3.8320 4.31 3.8252 4.13 3.8875 5.82 
23 3.8166 3.8709 1.42 3.8446 0.73 3.8530 0.95 3.8471 0.80 3.9019 2.23 
24 3.8059 3.8709 1.71 3.8446 1.02 3.8530 1.24 3.8471 1.08 3.9019 2.52 
25 3.7479 3.9329 4.93 3.9187 4.56 3.9231 4.67 3.9200 4.59 3.9493 5.37 
26 3.7242 3.9059 4.88 3.8863 4.35 3.8925 4.52 3.8882 4.40 3.9287 5.49 
27 3.6674 3.8709 5.55 3.8446 4.83 3.8530 5.06 3.8471 4.90 3.9019 6.39 
Average error (%) 3.90 - 3.28 - 3.43 - 3.36 - 4.96 
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Table C.3: Average number of jobs in the manufacturer’s 
      system in the case of four suppliers. 
o 
Simul. 
results (3.35) 
Error 
(3.35) (3.36) 
Error 
(3.36) (3.37) 
Error 
(3.37) (3.38) 
Error 
(3.38) (3.39) 
Error 
(3.39) 
1 0.9441 0.9893 4.79 0.9833 4.16 0.9845 4.28 0.9844 4.27 0.9996 5.88 
2 0.9293 0.9893 6.45 0.9833 5.81 0.9845 5.94 0.9844 5.92 0.9996 7.56 
3 0.9423 0.9893 4.98 0.9833 4.35 0.9845 4.48 0.9844 4.46 0.9996 6.07 
4 0.9167 0.9790 6.80 0.9681 5.61 0.9704 5.86 0.9701 5.83 0.9984 8.92 
5 0.9427 0.9908 5.11 0.9857 4.57 0.9867 4.67 0.9866 4.66 0.9997 6.05 
6 0.9229 0.9893 7.19 0.9833 6.54 0.9845 6.67 0.9844 6.66 0.9996 8.30 
7 0.9439 0.9759 3.38 0.9636 2.08 0.9662 2.36 0.9659 2.32 0.9979 5.72 
8 0.9400 0.9893 5.24 0.9833 4.61 0.9845 4.73 0.9844 4.72 0.9996 6.33 
9 0.9299 0.9908 6.55 0.9857 6.00 0.9867 6.11 0.9866 6.09 0.9997 7.50 
10 1.8761 1.9665 4.82 1.9448 3.66 1.9511 3.99 1.9480 3.83 1.9961 6.39 
11 1.9222 1.9665 2.31 1.9448 1.18 1.9511 1.50 1.9480 1.34 1.9961 3.85 
12 1.9255 1.9665 2.13 1.9448 1.00 1.9511 1.33 1.9480 1.16 1.9961 3.66 
13 1.9258 2.0016 3.93 1.9912 3.40 1.9940 3.54 1.9926 3.47 2.0153 4.65 
14 1.9120 1.9665 2.85 1.9448 1.72 1.9511 2.04 1.9480 1.88 1.9961 4.40 
15 1.9794 2.0232 2.21 2.0205 2.08 2.0212 2.11 2.0209 2.09 2.0267 2.39 
16 1.9203 1.9665 2.41 1.9448 1.28 1.9511 1.60 1.9480 1.44 1.9961 3.95 
17 1.8795 1.9665 4.63 1.9448 3.47 1.9511 3.81 1.9480 3.64 1.9961 6.20 
18 1.8851 1.9665 4.32 1.9448 3.17 1.9511 3.50 1.9480 3.33 1.9961 5.89 
19 3.6575 3.8709 5.83 3.8446 5.12 3.8530 5.35 3.8471 5.18 3.9019 6.68 
20 3.7974 3.8709 1.93 3.8446 1.24 3.8530 1.46 3.8471 1.31 3.9019 2.75 
21 3.5624 3.8709 8.66 3.8446 7.92 3.8530 8.16 3.8471 7.99 3.9019 9.53 
22 3.5790 3.8522 7.63 3.8224 6.80 3.8320 7.07 3.8252 6.88 3.8875 8.62 
23 3.5707 3.8709 8.41 3.8446 7.67 3.8530 7.91 3.8471 7.74 3.9019 9.28 
24 3.6380 3.8709 6.40 3.8446 5.68 3.8530 5.91 3.8471 5.75 3.9019 7.25 
25 3.8650 3.9329 1.76 3.9187 1.39 3.9231 1.50 3.9200 1.42 3.9493 2.18 
26 3.6656 3.9059 6.55 3.8863 6.02 3.8925 6.19 3.8882 6.07 3.9287 7.18 
27 3.7002 3.8709 4.61 3.8446 3.90 3.8530 4.13 3.8471 3.97 3.9019 5.45 
Average error (%) 4.89 - 4.09 - 4.30 - 4.20 - 6.02 
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